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Social psychological research on the relations between heterosexual people and sexual 
minorities generally falls within two bodies of literature: 1) research conducted to elucidate 
heterosexual people’s biases and 2) research used to identify predictors of coping and stress 
among sexual minorities.  In contrast, relatively fewer efforts in social psychology seek to 
understand how minority groups perceive dominant groups.  In this dissertation, I address 
intergroup dynamics from the standpoint of sexual minorities (LGBQ people; lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and queer) in a scale development study and two experimental studies.  In Study 1, I 
evaluate the psychometric properties of a newly created measure of a construct that has not yet 
been empirically tested: upward contempt (i.e., a low status group’s contempt for and 
disapproval of a higher status group).  Specifically, I examine LGBQ people’s upward contempt 
for heterosexual people.  Consistent with my predictions, to the extent that LGBQ participants 
acknowledge status discrepancies between heterosexual and LGBQ people, they feel upward 
contempt for heterosexual people.  The Upward Contempt Scale (16 items; e.g., “Heterosexual 
people aren’t as great as they think they are”) can be used as a stand-alone tool or in conjunction 
with other instruments to investigate minority groups’ perceptions of dominant groups.  In 
Studies 2 and 3, I build upon Matsick and Conley (2016a) to examine the function of minority 
groups’ stereotypes about dominant groups.  In particular, I test how stereotypes about a 
dominant outgroup (i.e., heterosexual people) influence sexual minorities’ psychological well-
being.  I find that LGBQ participants who are exposed to stereotypes about heterosexuals feel 
more positive psychological outcomes related to their identities (e.g., feeling affirmed, proud, 
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	 viii 
and happy with being LGBQ) than those not exposed to heterosexual stereotypes.  This pattern 
of results suggests that LGBQ people’s views of heterosexual people affect LGBQ health and 
well-being— a predictor of minority stress that remains untested in previous research.  Drawing 
on feminist methodological frameworks (i.e., feminist standpoint theory), I elucidate nuances of 
studying minority groups’ perspectives within social psychological theories and I identify 
features of minority groups’ perspectives that can inform members of dominant groups about 
strategies to improve intergroup relations. 
Keywords: LGBQ, heterosexual, upward contempt, stereotypes, intergroup relations
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A voluminous collection of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination research positions 
stigmatized group members as “objects” of analysis and majority group members as “subjects” 
(Amir, 1969, as explained in Shelton, 2000).  Beginning with Allport (1954), intergroup relations 
research has overwhelmingly favored the study of dominant groups’ thoughts, attitudes, and 
behaviors about and toward people with marginalized identities (e.g., stereotypes about Black 
Americans, attitudes toward gay and lesbian people).  In particular, for nearly three decades, 
relatively few studies have examined sexual minorities’ perceptions (i.e., thoughts and attitudes) 
of heterosexual people compared to the large body of work focused on heterosexual people’s 
perceptions of lesbian women and gay men (cf. Conley, Calhoun, Evett, & Devine, 2001; 
Conley, Devine, Rabow, & Evett, 2003; Matsick & Conley, 2016a; Vaughn & Teeters, 2015; 
White & Franzini, 1999).  For example, a substantial body of research tests heterosexual 
people’s thoughts and beliefs about sexual minorities (e.g., Kite & Deaux, 1987) and 
heterosexual people’s prejudice and discriminatory behaviors toward lesbian women and gay 
men (e.g., Bailey, Wallace, & Wright, 2013; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993; Herek, 1989, 
2000; Kite & Whitley, 1996; Massey, 2010; Morrison & Morrison, 2002).  Much of this work 
aims to understand predictors of prejudice that reproduce status discrepancies.  These areas of 
inquiry clearly yield important implications for identifying and reducing prejudice between 
groups; however, given that intergroup relations are a two-way process, the omission of minority 
groups’ perspectives leaves an incomplete picture of intergroup perceptions.   
CHAPTER 1: General Introduction 
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Feminist methodologists and social-personality psychologists have called on researchers 
to attend to minority groups’ perspectives that are commonly “left out” of research (Fine & 
Gordon, 1992; Fonow & Cook, 1991; Reinharz, 1992; Stewart, 1998; Stewart & McDermott, 
2004).  This approach to psychological and sociological research echoes scholarship in feminist 
critical theory who promote the feminist standpoint as a better means of doing science.  At the 
core of feminist standpoint theory (i.e., a feminist approach to research that allows researchers to 
account for power and politics in their science) is the belief that knowledge is socially situated 
and that the limits of knowledge depend on its sources and context (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 
1986, 2004).  That is, despite science’s claims of objectivity, the social locations of both subject 
and researcher influence the possibilities of knowledge (Collins, 1986).   
Scholars of feminist epistemology and philosophy of science argue that dominant 
frameworks and research practices underserve minority communities by deeming their 
perspectives as inferior or deviant, by reproducing the dominant standpoint as normative or 
standard, and by producing knowledge that does not empower minorities or reflect minorities’ 
worldviews and experiences (see Harding, 1986, 2004).  Thus, the inclusion of minority groups 
in science not only diversifies samples and strengthens the validity of theory; but also, their 
inclusion repositions the angles through which knowledge is acquired.  When minority groups’ 
perspectives are incorporated into research, a different picture of the context emerges than what 
can be gathered from the dominant standpoint.  In particular, as feminist standpoint theorists 
suggest, minority groups are better equipped to identify patterns of behavior that otherwise go 
undetected by those who are not marginalized (e.g., Haraway, 1988; Hartsock, 1983).  Thus, a 
minority-focused approach to research should hold remarkable value to those who study 
intergroup relations. 
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Accordingly, there are characteristics about intergroup dynamics that cannot be 
uncovered by examining the perspectives of dominant groups; thus, if one seeks to understand 
the current status between groups, both sides must serve as sources (not only as targets).  Social 
psychologists have similarly encouraged researchers to treat minorities as active agents in the 
intergroup process.  Researchers should consider how minorities’ attitudes and behaviors 
influence intergroup dynamics and their own well-being; specifically, stigma and prejudice 
researchers argue that minority groups are not merely passive recipients of stigma, but are a 
functioning part of the intergroup process (Conley, Rabinowitz, & Matsick, 2015; Contrada et 
al., 2000; Matsick & Conley, 2016a, 2016b; Monteith & Spicer, 2000; Oyserman & Swim, 2001; 
Shelton, 2000; Shelton, Alegre, & Son, 2010).  For example, as Shelton (2000) explains, “In the 
typical experiment on prejudice, Whites are treated as participants who can provide researchers 
with information, whereas Blacks are treated as a relatively homogenous and amorphous group 
in the form of photographs or experimental confederates” (p. 374).  Ultimately, Shelton (2000) 
and other stigma and prejudice researchers propose that there is bias within the study of 
intergroup biases and that researchers should consider minority groups as “functioning 
individuals who can influence intergroup dynamics” if they aim to explore the full picture and 
complexity of intergroup relations (Shelton, 2000; p. 375). 
In the current research, I prioritize minority standpoint in the study of intergroup 
relations.  Specifically, I examine lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, and transgender (LGBQT) 
individuals’ perceptions of heterosexual people and how perceptions of heterosexual people 
relate to LGBQ people’s psychological health and well-being.  Within each chapter, I review 
previous research that guides my aims and hypotheses for each study; here, I draw on stigma and 
prejudice research to address empirical approaches to studying LGBQ and heterosexual group 
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dynamics.   
Intergroup Dynamics Among LGBQ and Heterosexual People 
Although researchers have examined the thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors of 
heterosexual people toward LGBQ people, less attention is given to the ways in which LGBQ 
individuals perceive heterosexual people (cf. Conley et al., 2001; Conley et al., 2003; Matsick & 
Conley, 2016a; Vaughn & Teeters, 2015; White & Franzini, 1999).  As previously discussed, a 
large body of research documents stereotypes that heterosexuals hold about lesbian women and 
gay men (e.g., Herek, 1991), heterosexual people’s anti-gay attitudes (e.g., Herek, 2009), and 
discriminatory behaviors toward LGBQ people (e.g., Bailey et al., 2013).  For example, through 
these studies we have learned that college students perceive gay and lesbian professors as having 
stronger political agendas, greater biases, and less competence than heterosexual professors 
(Anderson & Kanner, 2011), and that heterosexual people’s attitudes toward lesbian women and 
gay men differ as a function of gender, religious ideologies, and previous experiences with 
sexual minorities (Herek, 1988).  These well-established areas of research pursue a critical line 
of inquiry to test the ways in which people with social and political power (i.e., heterosexual 
individuals) perceive and interact with those who have relatively less power.  Moreover, this 
body of research evaluates strategies for reducing people’s endorsement of anti-gay stereotypes, 
prejudice, and discrimination.   
A second area of research in LGBQ psychology departs from the traditional model of 
prejudice research by using LGBQ individuals as participants in research (rather than as targets 
of person-perception paradigms).  Researchers working within this framework aim to uncover 
the ways in which anti-gay stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination affect sexual minorities; 
specifically, these researchers are interested in how LGBQ respond to prejudice and how they 
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cope with stigma.  Much of this work is explained by social stress theory.   
Social stress theory posits that social contexts (e.g., prejudice, stigma, experiences with 
other groups) generate stress that adversely affects health outcomes among those with socially 
stigmatized identities (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998).  As an extension of social stress theory, 
researchers define LGBQ people’s identity-related stress as “minority stress,” or the chronic 
stress experienced by LGBQ people that results from managing a stigmatized identity.  Minority 
stress develops through a variety of experiences common among LGBQ people: disclosing or 
“coming out” to others, internalizing negative messages about same-sex sexuality, encountering 
social rejection, and enduring anti-gay prejudice and discrimination (Meyer, 2003, 2007).  
Further, the fact that LGBQ people experience greater stressors than their heterosexual 
counterparts can help to explain a host of mental and physical health disparities between LGBQ 
and heterosexual individuals.  For example, in a large sample of LGB- and heterosexual-
identified participants, Meyer, Schwartz, and Frost (2008) found that sexual minorities 
experienced greater acute stressors and prejudice-related stressors than their heterosexual peers.  
Moreover, in an examination of stress and physical health outcomes, Frost, Lehavot, and Meyer 
(2015) found that LGB-identified people who experienced a prejudice-specific stressor within 
the past year were more likely to report a physical health issue at a follow-up one year later 
compared to those who did not experience a prejudice-specific stressor.  Drawing on these 
findings, researchers conclude that stressors related to prejudice, as opposed to general life 
stressors, uniquely impact mental and physical health outcomes among those with LGBQ 
identities (Frost et al., 2015). 
Another shared feature of social stress theory and the minority stress model is a focus on 
factors that disrupt the relationship between stress and health outcomes.  Stigma researchers 
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share a long-standing goal of detecting moderators that buffer the negative psychological effects 
of stigmatization (e.g., affirming the group or instilling a sense of group belonging can alleviate 
stigma-related stress; Crocker & Major, 1989; Dovidio, Major, & Crocker, 2000; Major, 
Mendes, & Dovidio, 2013; Major & O'Brien, 2005; C. T. Miller & Major, 2000; Walton & 
Cohen, 2011).  Similarly, the minority stress model tests the roles of social support, coping 
strategies, and community affiliation as buffers to stress (see Meyer, 2003 for further discussion).  
Thus, not only do theories of social stress and minority stress test associations between stigma, 
stress, and health; but also, both theories identify strategies to preserve psychological well-being 
among members of stigmatized groups even when they are faced with prejudice. 
To review, within research on LGBQ and heterosexual relations, there are two main 
camps: 1) researchers who elucidate heterosexual people’s intergroup biases and 2) researchers 
who examine predictors of LGBQ people’s health via theories of social stress.  In both areas, 
researchers seek to improve the lives of LGBQ people and offer well-established frameworks for 
explaining LGBQ people’s psychological adjustment.  However, to my knowledge, neither body 
of research accounts for LGBQ people’s perceptions of other groups.  That is, very little research 
addresses LGBQ people’s perceptions of heterosexuals in the stereotyping and prejudice 
literature, and LGBQ people’s perceptions of heterosexuals are noticeably absent from the 
minority stress literature (with the exception of the minority stress model’s evaluation of 
internalized homophobia which, to some extent, addresses sexual minorities’ perceptions of 
heterosexuality through one’s internalized prejudice toward same-sex sexuality).  Although it is 
premature to claim how and why perceptions of heterosexuals are a meaningful feature of LGBQ 
people’s lives, it is worth testing the potential role that perceptions of heterosexuals may play in 
the psychology of LGBQ people.  Accordingly, researchers may have to reach across their 
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subdisciplinary boundaries to create the scaffolding required to explain minority groups’ 
perceptions of dominant groups.  Take, for example, Cox, Abramson, Devine, and Hollon (2012) 
who propose a model of “deprejudice”— a term used to convey the comorbidity of prejudice and 
depression among targets of prejudice.  At the most basic level, a deprejudice framework 
integrates the work of social psychologists fighting prejudice with that of clinical psychologists 
fighting depression.  In particular, Cox et al. (2012) encourage researchers to move beyond their 
subdisciplinary homes to provide a more complex and comprehensive account of prejudice and 
psychological health.  Similarly, I argue that research questions once thought to be housed in 
intergroup relations research should merge with those related to minority stress.  An examination 
of minority groups’ perceptions of dominant outgroups provides researchers with the opportunity 
to uncover another predictor of minorities’ psychological health (an important concern among 
minority stress researchers) and to better understanding intergroup processes (a driving force 
behind research on intergroup biases). 
Given that members of minority groups are not merely passive recipients of stigma (as 
suggested by Contrada et al., 2000; Oyserman & Swim, 2001; Shelton, 2000; Shelton et al., 
2010; Shelton & Richeson, 2006a, 2006b), we can expect that minorities have had ample 
opportunities to observe dominant groups’ behaviors to formulate their own stereotypes about 
and attitudes toward members of dominant groups.  For example, Matsick and Conley (2016a) 
examined cultural stereotypes and personal beliefs about heterosexual people held among LGBQ 
people and found that LGBQ people reported highly gendered and negative perceptions of 
heterosexual target groups (e.g., participants stereotyped heterosexual women as being overly 
vain and inauthentically flirtatious with other women).  Moreover, Conley et al. (2001) assessed 
how sexual minorities’ interpret heterosexual people’s actions to investigate mistakes that 
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heterosexual people make when trying to appear non-prejudiced.  The results of Matsick and 
Conley (2016a) and Conley et al. (2001) suggest that dominant group members’ intentions in 
intergroup interactions can greatly differ from the impact of their behaviors on sexual minorities.  
That is, even well-meaning heterosexual people may unknowingly offend sexual minorities and, 
if dominant groups gain better insight into how minorities perceive them, they can better avoid 
acting in ignorance.  For example, a heterosexual man may offer to connect his lesbian co-
worker with another lesbian woman who he knows in hopes of setting them up to date.  Although 
his intentions in playing match-maker may seem harmless, his behavior can be interpreted by his 
lesbian colleague as stereotypically lumping all gay people together (i.e., assumptions of 
outgroup homogeneity; Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981) or implying that all gay women are attracted 
to one another (i.e., heterosexual men's eroticization of lesbianism; Whitley, Wiederman, & 
Wryobeck, 1999).  Similarly, a heterosexual woman might enthusiastically ask a gay man to take 
her to a gay bar.  Although the woman’s intentions may appear to be a sign of allyship and her 
comfort with being around gay men and lesbians, the gay man may interpret this act as 
appropriating his lifestyle and access to safe public spaces into a heterosexual woman’s 
adventure. 
Such examples illustrate how LGBQ people can identify ways in which heterosexual 
people hamper rather than enhance intergroup interactions.  Heterosexual people are likely 
unaware of how the LGBQ people in their lives perceive them; yet, this knowledge could help to 
improve relations between these groups, especially among heterosexual people who are 
motivated to reduce their prejudice.  Knowing how LGBQ people perceive heterosexuals can 
also strengthen our understanding of how LGBQ people’s perceptions of others relate to their 
own health: is there a link between psychological well-being and the ways in which LGBQ 
 		 9 
people perceive heterosexuals?  As I will discuss more thoroughly in Study 2, previous research 
on intergroup behavior suggests that intergroup perceptions relate to various aspects of 
psychological health for ingroup members (e.g., self-esteem, feelings of pride, ingroup 
solidarity); thus, it is reasonable to expect that perceptions of heterosexual people are associated 
with LGBQ well-being.  
The Current Research 
In a series of studies, I examine intergroup perceptions from the minority standpoint (i.e., 
from the perspective of LGBQ people).  In Study 1, I evaluate the psychometric properties of a 
newly created measure of a construct that has not yet been empirically tested: upward contempt.  
Upward contempt, defined as minority groups’ contempt for and disapproval of dominant 
groups, is an unexplored dimension of intergroup perceptions that provides insight into how 
minority groups’ perceive dominant groups.  In Study 1, I evaluate sexual minorities’ feelings of 
upward contempt for heterosexual people.  In Studies 2 and 3, I extend the results of Matsick and 
Conley (2016a) to examine the function of minority groups’ stereotypes about dominant groups.  
In particular, I test how stereotypes about a dominant outgroup (i.e., heterosexual people) can 
influence sexual minorities’ psychological well-being.  Within each study, I discuss future 
research directions and implications for understanding the psychological health of sexual 
minorities. 
 	 	 	 10 
	
  
Group-based emotions are emotions that influence intergroup attitudes and depend on 
how individuals categorize themselves and others into groups (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; 
Goldenberg, Halperin, van Zomeren, & Gross, 2016; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Iyer & 
Leach, 2008; Smith, 1993).  Contempt is one group-based emotion of particular relevance to the 
study of intergroup biases.  Feelings of contempt convey people’s moral disapproval and 
perceived superiority over others (Izard, 1977); thus, contempt offers great insight into the 
relationship between groups that differ in societal status by marking some groups as superior and 
others as inferior.  Because contempt involves ranking individuals and groups on dimensions of 
superiority, contempt has political and social significance in understanding the socially 
constructed positions of various groups.  In this study, I critically examine contempt as a group-
based emotion and introduce the concept of “upward contempt” to psychology as another way to 
frame minority groups’ feelings about dominant groups.   
Contempt as an Intergroup and Prejudicial Emotion 
Basic definitions of contempt include feelings of scorn, derision, disrespect, disapproval 
of, and loathing toward an individual target or group of people.  Though contempt appears to 
encompass a host of features related other emotions, some scholars define contempt as a unique 
emotional response and distinguish it from other commonly-held emotions, such as disgust, hate, 
and pity (Ekman, 2003; Gottman & Levenson, 1999; Izard, 1977; Solomon, 1993).  At the most 
basic level, when a person feels contempt for an individual or group, s/he evaluates the target as 
CHAPTER 2: (Study 1) A Measure of Upward Contempt  
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being inferior and beneath a set of societal standards.  In contrast, disgust and hatred toward an 
individual/group suggest that the target is indeed displeasing and worthy of aversion, but not 
necessarily inferior (Ben-Ze'ev, 2001).  Although pity accounts for the perceived inferiority that 
is absent from feelings of disgust and hate, pity is short-lived and associated with feelings of 
compassion, whereas contempt is relatively more long-term and operates without compassion 
(W. I. Miller, personal communication, June 19, 2014; Solomon, 1993).  Moreover, because 
issues of equality and perceived inferiority fuel feelings of contempt, contempt can be relatively 
stable if status discrepancies and inferiority are maintained (Izard, 1977; W. I. Miller, 1995, 
1997; Solomon, 1993).   
Feelings of contempt often satisfy a person’s desire to make oneself appear more 
superior, powerful, and noble in comparison to the target, suggesting that the target in question is 
morally offensive and inferior to the perceiver (Solomon, 1993).  In order to feel contempt for a 
target, a person must have a strong sense of how the target fails to meet societal standards and 
expectations.  Relatedly, the notion that “familiarity breeds contempt” stems from the idea that a 
target’s flaws become more recognizable and salient to others over time (Ben-Ze'ev, 2001).  
Thus, it may be difficult to hold contempt for a novel stimulus, but easier to feel contempt 
toward a target whose attributes are effortlessly recalled.  Given that minority groups are more 
familiar with the characteristics and behaviors of the dominant group than vice versa (Fiske, 
1993), it seems likely that minorities have acquired sufficient familiarity with dominant group 
members to feel contempt for them.  Importantly, contempt does not deem a target as globally 
inferior; instead, contempt occurs in reference to specific characteristics of a target that are 
perceived as inferior (Ben-Ze'ev, 2001; W. I. Miller, 1995, 1997).  For example, a person can 
hold contempt for a target based on physical appearance, but s/he can recognize that the target 
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may be adequate, or even superior, in ways that are not related to appearance (e.g., the target can 
be intellectually superior despite being physically inferior to the perceiver).  Thus, a person can 
hold contempt for a target along some specific dimensions of character but not along others.  
Social psychologists typically discuss contempt in terms of downward social comparisons 
(i.e., the contempt people feel toward individuals or groups who are "beneath" them; Caprariello, 
Cuddy, & Fiske, 2009; Fiske, 2010, 2011).  Specifically, prejudice researchers find that people’s 
feelings of contempt for an outgroup largely depend on the ways in which they perceive the 
outgroup in terms of status and competition (e.g., Caprariello et al., 2009; Cuddy, Fiske, & 
Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).  To the extent that people perceive a low-status 
outgroup as competitive, they feel contempt for the outgroup (compared to feeling pity for a low 
status/uncompetitive outgroup, envy for a high status/competitive outgroup, and admiration for a 
high status/uncompetitive outgroup).  Furthermore, groups that are stereotyped as incompetent 
and cold (e.g., homeless people, welfare recipients) can elicit feelings of contempt from others 
(Fiske et al., 2002).  The groups at the receiving end of contemptuous prejudice (i.e., negative 
attitudes associated with contempt) are often deemed as being immoral, violating societal 
standards, and hindering the ingroup’s goals and plans (Cuddy et al., 2008; Rozin, Lowery, 
Imada, & Haidt, 1999).  Overall, high status groups elicit envy and admiration, whereas low 
status groups elicit pity and contempt.   
However, our knowledge of how emotions operate at the group-level mostly develops 
from samples of dominant group members (i.e., white, heterosexual, middle-class, and educated) 
in terms of how they feel about outgroups (e.g., non-whites, non-heterosexuals, people of lower 
socioeconomic status).  Given that a primary ingredient of contempt is people’s perceptions of a 
target as inferior, can people feel contempt toward those above them in social ranking? 
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Upward Contempt: Minorities’ Feelings of Contempt 
Scholars in political theory and philosophy argue that contempt occurs in an upward 
direction; that is, contempt can be held for higher status targets.  Upward contempt describes the 
contempt that members of low status groups feel for people who are of higher social status (e.g., 
the contempt that teenagers have for adults, blue-collared workers for white-collared employees, 
ethnic minorities for whites; W. I. Miller, 1995, 1997).  As suggested by Pelzer (2005), upward 
contempt likely emerges from the ample opportunities that low status people have had to closely 
observe the lifestyles and characteristics of high status people. 
Miller (1995, 1997) argues that upward contempt occurs when someone of low status 
perceives a high status target as inferior.  Specifically, upward contempt occurs when a low 
status person believes that the higher status target is below the level of which the higher status 
target claims itself to be.  Put simply, upward contempt characterizes a person’s beliefs that the 
high status target is simply not as great as it believes it is and is, in some ways, inferior to the 
low status perceiver.  Therefore, upward contempt allows a person of lower status to claim 
superiority to the higher status group, at least along one attribute.  To exemplify this tenet of 
upward contempt, Miller (1997) uses the example of “moral menials.”  Lawyers and politicians 
are generally perceived as high status group members; they have achieved financial success and 
likely hold powerful positions in society.  However, people may feel that lawyers and politicians 
are morally bankrupt and are indeed inferior to others when it comes to morality and nobility.  
Thus, while recognizing that lawyers and politicians hold great status in society, other people 
may claim superiority over these individuals on some dimensions of character. 
In addition to allowing a person of lower status to perceive superiority over a high status 
target, upward contempt occurs when a low status person perceives high status people’s values 
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and social institutions as “silly” or “a cause for general mirth” (W. I. Miller, 1997; p. 222).  As a 
result, the attributes and values in which high status people may be superior are perceived to be 
inessential and deserving of ridicule.  For example, an atheist (a low status person in the United 
States) may find the strong religious convictions and institutions of those with higher status as 
unnecessary for living a full life.  Further, an atheist might find religious people’s unquestioning 
loyalty to pious institutions and texts as ridiculous and nonsensical.  Thus, by evaluating the 
characteristics and values of high status people, a low status person is able to claim superiority 
and discredit the significance of high status people’s qualities that they use to defend their 
dominance over others.  This tendency to devalue dimensions on which one’s own group fares 
poorly is consistent with previous research that examines how members of disadvantaged groups 
protect their psychological sense of self (Crocker & Major, 1989). 
Miller (1997) suggests that upward contempt emerges in response to being a common 
target of downward contempt.  Accordingly, upward contempt can be considered as a form of 
rebellion, or a way to cope with habitual humiliation and defeat as a low status person.  Because 
low status individuals assert superiority through feelings of upward contempt, it may be an 
enjoyable emotion to experience.  Nevertheless, upward contempt does not distort one’s 
perceptions of the status discrepancies in society.  That is, a low status person holding upward 
contempt understands that s/he is still of low status and beneath those who are targets of upward 
contempt.  Further, high status people are likely unaware that people beneath them hold this form 
of contempt and nuanced sense of superiority.  High status people may even feel that they are 
globally admired, respected, and envied by low status group members (W. I. Miller, 1997; 
Pelzer, 2005); thus, upward contempt is truly a low status, or minority, issue– it is established, 
recognized, and held among members of minority groups. 
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 Despite upward contempt’s implications for understanding low status groups’ thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors in relation to high status groups, the concept of upward contempt is 
practically non-existent in psychology (cf. research on contempt in organizations in Pelzer, 
2005).  Within the large body of psychological research on the dynamics between low status and 
high status groups, the lack of attention given to upward contempt is unfortunate because this 
prejudicial emotion may help to explain how members of minority groups perceive members of 
dominant groups.  Because there is a dearth of research on upward contempt, I turn to how 
scholars have observed instances of upward contempt in popular culture and among LGBQ 
participants in qualitative studies.  
Preliminary Evidence: Cultural and Empirical Observations of Upward Contempt 
In order to express contempt for people of high status, members of minority groups 
require safe and sequestered spaces to critique dominant groups.  If openly and earnestly 
conveyed, feelings of upward contempt or disapproval of the dominant group could endanger 
members of minority groups for challenging a dominant group’s status; thus, shared critiques 
among insubordinates often occur in hidden circles or are masked in humor or performance 
(Scott, 1990).  Importantly, it may be easier (and safer) for low status groups to play openly with 
power dynamics in relatively benign arenas of power than threatening the deservingness of high 
status groups to more consequential forms of power (e.g., economic and political power).  For 
example, Hart (2004) explains the inversion of power dynamics between LGBQ and 
heterosexual people through the former hit reality television series Queer Eye for the Straight 
Guy.  The show features a team of five gay men whose purpose is to reform a heterosexual guy 
into a culturally sensitive, stylish, nurturing, and well-mannered man.  In each episode, a team of 
gay men transform a new “project”— a heterosexual man in need of a make-over from his gay 
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counterparts.  The show depicts gay men’s attributes and skills as superior to those of 
heterosexual men and the team is known for ridiculing their heterosexual projects for failing to 
possess the refined qualities of gay men.  Ultimately, the series exemplifies that it is “just as easy 
for gay men to make fun of heterosexuals as it has been for heterosexuals to make fun, for 
decades on television, of gay men” (Hart, 2004; p. 247).  As previously discussed, upward 
contempt involves the perceived superiority of low status groups to high status groups; thus, the 
inversion of power dynamics, even in trivial domains, demonstrate minority groups’ potential to 
reclaim superiority. 
As another source of evidence for upward contempt, Matsick and Conley (2016a) found 
that LGBQ people perceive heterosexual people as leading boring lives, having mediocre sexual 
experiences, adhering to more rigid gender roles, and being more closed-minded and judgmental 
than LGBQ people.  Describing stereotypes about heterosexual women, one lesbian participant 
commented: “I’ll never get how straight girls can have sex with guys and even live with them! 
It’s kind of sad but funny because they really don’t know what they’re missing b/c [sic] men 
don’t know women’s bodies like other women do.”  This participant’s response suggests that 
better sexual and relational experiences are afforded to women who have relationships with other 
women.  Similarly, some participants reported that LGBQ people are intellectually and morally 
superior to heterosexuals (e.g., open-minded).  For example, one participant suggested that gay 
and lesbian people are more socially conscientious than heterosexual people: 
Being queer, I’m afraid of dealing with hate every day from straights […] I wish there 
was a way to get straights to understand what this is like. Or even, how it would feel to 
have the tables turned, to having being “straight” as the minority, and being “gay” as the 
norm. They have a lot of good things going for them but they’d never think of any of this 
on their own until they could walk in our shoes. That’s why it is easier to be around gay 
people who like talking about these things and are more sensitive about how their actions 
and words effect [sic] other people… 
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In addition to commenting on the perceived ways in which heterosexual people fall short 
when compared to LGBQ people, participants also reported that heterosexual people are unaware 
of privileges they gain based on their sexual orientation.  Moreover, participants suggested that 
heterosexuals flaunt their access to dominant culture and mainstream institutions (in this case, 
marriage).  As a gay male participant explained: 
Most of the time, I think I feel annoyed by heteros. If I had a nickel for every time I heard 
a straight girl talk about her HUSBAND or HUBBY, I’d be rich! It’s like they are 
incapable of talking about anything else and will always find a way to bring up their 
husband. We get it. You’re married. You have no idea that I’ve been in a relationship for 
16 years and still cannot call my partner my ‘husband.’ It hurts… I guess it’s just easier 
for me to think she’s an idiot than dwell on it. Ha!1  
 
 Not only does this participant’s response address heterosexual privilege; but also, the 
participant clearly takes issue with heterosexual people who do not recognize sexual privilege 
and existing inequality.  Specifically, the participant explains that it is “just easier” to focus on a 
heterosexual woman’s ignorance regarding her privilege than dwell on issues of injustice.  This 
type of response suggests that feelings of upward contempt, or derogating members of the 
dominant group, may have some protective psychological qualities for minorities especially 
when minorities feel threatened or hurt by the dominant group or status quo.  Relatedly, one 
participant expressed her frustration with dominant groups being in a superior position to 
“accept” her:  
We still hear comments from otherwise smart (heterosexual) people that go something 
like this: I accept them/you. Accept? I want to wipe my brow and say: Thank you very 
much!! And, I accept your alcoholism, philandering, gambling, and unwavering loyalty 
to the Catholic Church and masses on Sundays.  
 
This participant’s response supports Miller’s (1995) argument that upward contempt is 
connected to institutions and values (e.g., the Catholic Church) that some may perceive as 
frivolous and; moreover, minority group members call the admirable status of heterosexual 
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people into question.  Importantly, those who feel upward contempt continue to acknowledge the 
allocated social locations and difference in status between the perceiver (minority group) and 
target (dominant group)— that is, despite the negative aspects of heterosexuality that participants 
identify, participants recognize that heterosexuals are high status and minority groups are low 
status.  Ultimately, participants echoed Miller’s assertion that though upward contempt may 
build group cohesion among members of low status groups by derogating the high status group, 
“the truth is that they would switch places with the dominant group in a heartbeat” (W. I. Miller, 
personal communication, June 19, 2014). 
Taken together, cultural examples and qualitative data support the idea that contempt is 
held by sexual minorities toward heterosexual people.  Other prejudicial emotions that occur in 
an upward direction (e.g., jealousy, envy, anger, and hatred) may be used to describe LGBQ 
people’s emotions; however, I argue that “upward contempt” is a more fitting label for LGBQ 
people’s attitudes and affect toward heterosexual people.  In the current research, I test how 
upward contempt relates to other emotions that are typically used to describe feelings toward 
heterosexual people and I develop a new tool for measuring minority groups’ attitudes toward 
dominant groups. 
The Current Research 
In Study 1, I evaluate the psychometric properties of a newly created measure of a 
construct that has not yet been empirically tested: upward contempt.  Upward contempt, defined 
as minority groups’ contempt for or disapproval of dominant groups, is an unexplored dimension 
of intergroup perceptions.  Although there is no shortage of psychological measures to assess 
intergroup processes, as Clark and Watson (1995) state, “human psychology is sufficiently 
complex that there is no limit to the number of psychological constructs that can be 
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operationalized as scales” (p. 310).  Accordingly, although upward contempt may have 
similarities to extant psychological measures, this new instrument will provide additional insight 
into the complexity of minority groups’ perspectives.  Further, the new scale emphasizes the 
standpoint of minorities— by creating new measures to assess minority groups’ processes, 
researchers can avoid overgeneralizing measures developed from dominant group perspectives 
by applying them to minority groups.  The upward contempt measure can be considered as one 
of many factors that characterize minority groups’ perceptions of dominant groups.   
The purpose of Study 1 is to develop a psychological tool to evaluate upward contempt.  
Scale development is achieved through a standard set of practices.  The American Psychological 
Association, as summarized by Hinkin (1998), recommends that new measures demonstrate 
content validity, criterion-related validity, and internal consistency.  To satisfy these criteria, I 
generated a set of items that cover the definition of upward contempt, collected data from a large 
sample of LGBQ-identified participants, refined the survey items and factor structures, 
established correlations with theoretically similar and different measures, and tested how upward 
contempt varies as a function of participants’ demographics (e.g., age, gender).  Overall, this 
study offers a nuanced way of understanding minority groups’ perceptions and yields new 
empirical territory in intergroup perceptions and LGBQ people’s experiences. 
Methods 
Participants  
 I recruited online, LGBQ-identified participants in various cities across the U.S.   
Prior to analysis, participants were removed from the dataset if they did not meet the survey 
inclusion criterion (i.e., identifying as non-heterosexual).  Twenty-eight participants who 
identified as heterosexual were removed and three participants were removed because they had 
 		 20 
indicated at the end of the survey that they had not provided honest and serious responses when 
completing the survey.   
 Recommended sample sizes for scale development vary based on the nature of the 
study’s design.  The most common recommendation is to include 200-300 participants if 
interitem correlations are moderate (Comrey, 1988; Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988; Hinkin, 1998); 
however, Clark and Watson (1995) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2012) suggest that at least 300 
observations should be included in any factor examination.  Another technique to estimate 
sample adequacy is to rely on an item-to-respondent ratio.  Suggested item-to-respondent ratios 
range from as liberal as 1:4 to as conservative as 1:10 (Rummel, 1970; Schwab, 1980).  In the 
current survey, 28 items were included to develop the new measure; thus, the conservative 
estimate would recommend that at least 280 participants be surveyed.  The final sample size 
exceeds this recommendation.   
Participants were recruited by online advertisements describing a 10-minute study posted 
on classified advertisement pages (e.g., craigslist.com) and LGBQT-oriented listservs (e.g., 
Facebook.com groups).  This online method of recruitment has its advantages, one of which is 
providing access to large samples of LGBQ-identified individuals (as used in Conley, Rubin, 
Matsick, Ziegler, & Moors, 2014; Matsick & Conley, 2016a).  Further, online sampling 
techniques provide a greater range of outness among those with LGBQ identities, age, and 
regional diversity than found in laboratory-based studies (Frankel & Siang, 1999; Riggle, 
Rostosky, & Reedy, 2005; Rosser, Oakes, Bockting, & Miner, 2007).  The online advertisement 
included the following information: 
We are researchers at the University of Michigan and are interested in the emotions and 
experiences of LGBQT-identified individuals.  This survey is voluntary and takes most 
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people 10-15 minutes to complete.  If you choose to participate in the survey, you will 
have the option of providing your name and email address to be entered into a raffle to 
win a $25 Amazon.com gift card.  If you are at least 18 years old and identify as LGBQ, 
please click here to participate: (survey link). 
Following conservative sampling size recommendations, 371 LGBQ-identified 
participants were included in the sample.  Forty-nine percent of the sample was female, 37% 
male, 9% transgender, and 6% preferred not to answer.  Eighty-three participants identified as 
lesbian, 96 as gay, 156 as bisexual or pansexual (56% female), and 36 as queer (33% female).  
The average age of the sample was 35 years old (age range 17 to 74 years) and one quarter of 
participants were currently undergraduate students.  Seventy percent of the sample identified as 
European American/White, 3% as Asian American/Asian, 9% as multiracial, 9% as Latina/o, 6% 
as African American/Black, 2% identified as Native American, and 2% did not provide their 
ethnicity.  Nearly one-third of participants resided in the Northeast (32%), and 27% were in the 
Midwest, 20% in the South and Southeast, 12% in the West, 7% in the Southwest, and 3% 
indicated that they live in another region.  All participants who provided personal contact 
information were entered into a raffle to win $25 gift cards.  Twenty participants were re-
contacted with compensation.   
Design and Procedure 
 Qualtrics Survey Software hosted the survey.  After providing their consent, participants 
responded to items assessing upward contempt, status discrepancies, emotions, and social 
desirability concerns.  At the beginning of the survey, participants were instructed to respond to 
questions based on “how they generally feel toward heterosexual people as a group.”  The 
measures were presented in a counter-balanced pattern in order to avoid order effects; each 
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participant received all of the measures.  Finally, participants completed a demographic 
questionnaire and volunteered their contact information if they wished to be considered for 
compensation. 
Measures  
See Appendix A for a complete list of items and measures used in Study 1. 
Upward contempt: Item generation.  To build content validity of the proposed 
measure, I used inductive reasoning to develop items that reflected LGBQ people’s responses in 
previous research and deductive reasoning to operationalize criteria that constitute upward 
contempt (conceptualized by W. I. Miller, 1995).  Following the recommended practice of over-
including items in a deliberate effort to thoroughly cover the construct (Clark & Watson, 1995; 
Springer, Abell, & Hudson, 2002), 28 initial items were developed to measure feelings of 
upward contempt.  Five researchers with expertise in LGBQ psychology and intergroup relations 
were given background information on upward contempt and then asked to review the set of 28 
items prior to data collection.  Based on the reviewers’ feedback, minor adjustments were made 
to clarify and refine the intended content of the items to best operationalize upward contempt.  
The response format included seven scale points to allow for subtle distinctions between the 
scale points, which may be lost when using too many or too few response options (1 = Strongly 
Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree).  The collection of items included five reverse-scored items to 
reduce response set bias (Price & Mueller, 1986) and the complete text of the 28 items appears in 
Table 1.1. 
Drawing on the central and descriptive tenets of the construct, I included items that 
assessed unwarranted status (i.e., believing that the high status group is actually below the level 
in which it claims for itself; 9 items), minorities’ superiority (i.e., expressing perceived 
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superiority over the high status group; 10 items), and devaluing attributes (i.e., debasing the 
ways in which the high status group is perceived as superior; 10 items).  For example, items were 
included that challenged the status quo (e.g., “Heterosexuals aren’t as great as they think they 
are”).  When developing a new measure, the items included to address each content area should 
be proportional to the importance of the area to the larger construct (Loevinger, 1957); thus, 
equal amounts of items were included per content area to evaluate upward contempt. 
 Acknowledgement of status discrepancies.  At its core, upward contempt requires a 
group to be lower in status than another group and for low status groups to be aware of the status 
difference between groups (W. I. Miller, 1995).  As such, the inclusion of items to evaluate 
perceived status discrepancies between heterosexual and LGBQ people can assist in testing one 
avenue of establishing predictive, criterion-related validity: does the new measure (upward 
contempt) significantly relate to a concept to which it theoretically should relate (perceived 
status discrepancies)?  Five items were included to address participants’ acknowledgement of 
heterosexual people’s higher status relative to LGBQ people.  All items were presented on a 
seven-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree): “Heterosexuals are more often in 
positions of power in society than LGBQ people,” “It is generally believed that LGBQ people 
are inferior to heterosexuals,” “Heterosexuals have greater societal status than LGBQ people,” 
“LGBQ people are treated like second-class citizens in society compared to heterosexual 
people,” and “LGBQ and heterosexual people hold equal social status” (reverse-scored).  These 
5 items were combined into the Acknowledgement of Status Discrepancies Scale (α = .74).  
Greater numbers reflect greater acknowledgement of status discrepancies between heterosexual 
and LGBQ people. 
Affect.  Participants were instructed “to think carefully about their feelings toward 
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heterosexual people as a group.”  Participants indicated the extent to which they felt each 
emotion toward heterosexual people in general on a seven-point scale (1 = Definitely Not, 7 = 
Definitely).  The 24 emotions included: jealous, envious, suspicious, afraid, upset, nervous, hurt, 
judged, distressed, frustrated, inspired, enthusiastic, angry, resentful, happy, comfortable, pity, 
fear, hatred, disdain, love, positive, negative, and disgust.  This set of items reflects the positive 
and negative subscales in the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Mackinnon et al., 1999), as 
well as LGBQ participants’ open-ended responses in previous research (Matsick & Conley, 
2016a).  Further, many of these emotions have been discussed in reference to upward contempt 
(e.g., anger, envy, disgust, hate; Ben-Ze'ev, 2001; W. I. Miller, 1995, 1997), but their 
relationships to upward contempt have not been empirically tested. 
Social desirability concerns.  A measure of social desirability concerns was included to 
evaluate participants’ motivation to respond in socially acceptable ways.  This type of scale is 
commonly used in prejudice research (e.g., Morrison, Morrison, Harriman, & Jewell, 2008) to 
detect the extent to which responses on new measures might be influenced by individuals’ desire 
to appear in a positive light (i.e., non-prejudiced).  Participants completed a 13-item short-form 
version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Ballard, 1992; Crowne & Marlowe, 
1960).  Participants were given a series of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits and 
were asked to indicate whether each statement was true or false of their typical behavior (α = .71; 
e.g., “I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different form my own”).  
Participants earned one point for each item on which they responded in a socially desirable 
manner.  Higher scores on this scale indicate a stronger motivation to appear culturally 
appropriate (ranging from 0-13).  Participants in this sample ranged from 0-12 in their social 
desirability scores. 
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Results 
  The analysis for scale development required several steps.  First, I sought to reduce the 
number of items to retain for a new upward contempt scale in order to yield a scale that is short 
enough to use in conjunction with other measures in research, has few redundant items, and has 
moderate interitem correlations.  Next, I submitted the remaining items to principal axis 
factoring (PAF) to assess the latent structure of an upward contempt scale.  After identifying 
factors (subscales) and evaluating internal consistency and distributions within the subscales, I 
acquired preliminary evidence of predictive, convergent, and discriminant validity.  Lastly, I 
tested for differences in reporting upward contempt as a function of gender, sexual orientation, 
age, and student status. 
Preliminary Analyses: Normality and Interitem Correlations  
 Consistent with Hinkin’s (1998) recommendations, I screened the initial 28 items to 
identify and eliminate items that had insufficient variance and non-normative distributions.  All 
items had adequate variability in responses and, across all items, the skew index (SI: ranging 
from 0.00 to |1.15|) and kurtosis index (KI: ranging from 0.00 to |1.27|) deemed the items 
acceptable to include in further analyses.  
 Next, I examined the interitem correlations.  Interitem correlations should ideally be 
moderate in magnitude (Clark & Watson, 1995) and, as recommended by Kim and Mueller 
(1978), I identified variables that did not correlate greater than .40 with at least one other 
variable.  In other words, a variable should correlate at .40 or greater with at least one other 
variable to be retained and, at the very least, variables that do not correlate with many variables 
above .30 should be considered for removal.  Given their low relationships to other variables, I 
decided to remove six items from further analyses (see Table 1.1; of note, five of the items 
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dropped for having low interitem correlations were reverse-scored items).  Further, two items 
were highly correlated and similar in wording [r(369) = .74, p < .001]; thus, I removed the item 
“LGBQ people have better mentalities than heterosexual people” to avoid redundancy with the 
retained item, “LGBQ people have been attitudes than heterosexual people.”  For the remaining 
analyses, 21 items were used. 
Factor-Structure Identification 
  Prior to extracting factors, I determined that the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test of 
sampling adequacy was sufficient (.92; a value between .5-1.0 suggests that patterns of 
correlations are compact and the sampling size is adequate; Kaiser, 1970, 1974) and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity was significant, x2(210) = 3853.08, p < .001, demonstrating that the correlation 
matrix is significantly different from zero.  Multicollinearity was not an issue (R determinant = 
.000024).   
  The main goal of this study is to reveal the latent structure of an upward contempt 
measure and produce a scale that can be used in future research with minority group members.  I 
submitted the 21 items to principal axis factoring (PAF) with oblique (promax) rotation to allow 
for correlated factors.  This rotation follows theoretical expectations that the resultant subscales 
of an upward contempt measure will be intercorrelated as found in other prejudice scales (e.g., 
Morrison & Morrison, 2002; Morrison et al., 2008; Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995).  That is, 
it seems reasonable to expect that factors of emotional prejudice (upward contempt) will not be 
independent from one another.  
 To determine the number of factors to extract, I assessed the eigenvalues (retaining 
factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1; Kaiser criterion) and a scree plot of the percentage of 
variance explained (using the point of inflexion as the cut-off for factor retention; Cattell, 1966).  
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Kaiser’s criterion (eigenvalues) can be considered if the sample is greater than 250 participants 
and communalities are quite high (on average, at least 0.6), whereas the scree plot provides 
reliable markers for factor selection if more than 200 participants are used (Stevens, 2002).  The 
average of communalities for the items after extraction was .51, suggesting that Kaiser’s criteria 
may be an inappropriate fit for these data.  However, both eigenvalues and the scree formation 
supported a three-factor solution; therefore, regardless of the strength of communalities, a three-
factor solution appears to be a fitting structure.  The reproduced correlation matrix (i.e., the 
residuals of the correlations based on the model and observable data) indicates that there are 34 
non-redundant residuals (16%) that are greater than .05 (it is suggested that non-redundant 
residuals should not exceed 50%). 
Factor loadings greater than .40 and loadings twice as strong on one factor than on any 
other factor is a meaningful way to organize the items by factors (Ford, MacCallum, & Tait, 
1986; Hinkin, 1998).  The ranges of loadings in the three-factor solution were as follows: Factor 
1 (8 items; .66-.86), Factor 2 (8 items; .60 to .77), and Factor 3 (5 items; .46 to .74).   
Factor 3 included fewer items and had the lowest factor loadings.  The item loadings of 
Factor 3 also loaded on Factor 1 and, as predicted, Factor 3 was correlated with Factor 1 [r(369) 
= .54, p < .001] and Factor 2 [r(369) = .48, p < .001].  Further, Factor 3 contained two items that 
had marginal differences between their loadings across all factors.  After examining the factor’s 
communalities and the wording of the five items, I decided to remove this set of items from 
further analysis and test a two-factor solution.  Of note, the content of Factor 3 namely addressed 
the devaluing aspect of upward contempt (e.g., “Some of heterosexuals’ moral values are 
ridiculous”)— I will return to the removal of this factor in the discussion. 
To review, using the original 28 items used in the survey, items were eliminated if they 
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had low correlations with other items or were highly correlated with at least one another item, or 
if they did not load highly on any factor (loading < .40) or loaded too similarly on more than one 
factor.  The final scale contains 16 items (8 items per factor).  The 16 retained items were 
resubmitted to principal axis factoring (PAF) with oblique (promax) rotation to determine final 
loadings and variance.  The items had moderate-to-high communalities (greater than .41) and the 
two-factor solution accounted for 58% of the variance.  The two-factor solution was supported 
by both eigenvalue and scree plot criteria and is used in all subsequent analyses.  See Table 1.2 
for the factor loadings of the two-factor solution. 
Subscales.  The first factor (eigenvalue = 6.25) included 8 items that ranged from .65 to 
.83 in their factor loadings.  I labeled this factor minorities’ superiority.  The second factor 
(eigenvalue = 3.09) included 8 items with factor loadings ranging from .61 to .77 and I labeled 
this factor unwarranted status.  The two subscales were correlated [r(369) = .35, p < .001], but not 
enough to suggest that the subscales should be abandoned in favor of a singular measure (note: 
given the interrelationships between factors, the oblique rotation was an appropriate choice for 
these data).  Moreover, the interitem correlations within each subscale (minorities’ superiority, 
average interitem correlation = .53; unwarranted status, average interitem correlation = .50) were 
stronger than the correlations between subscales (average interitem correlation = .20), providing 
support for keeping two subscales as part of the larger construct (Clark & Watson, 1995).  The 
unwarranted status subscale contained 8 items (α = .89) and the minorities’ superiority subscale 
contained 8 items (α = .90).2  Taken together, the 16 items comprised of the Upward Contempt 
Scale show high reliability (α = .89) and no skewness or kurtosis emerged in the final scale (SI = 
0.25; KI = 0.52).   
Establishing Criterion-Related Validity 
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  One step of the scale development process is to establish a “nomological network,” or a 
set of relationships between the newly developed scale and other psychological measures.  Here, 
I test predictive, convergent, and discriminant validity using the Acknowledgement of Status 
Discrepancies Scale, positive and negative emotions, social desirability concerns, and the newly 
formed Upward Contempt Scale.  In Table 1.3, I report coefficient alphas, means, standard 
deviations, and intercorrelations among the measures used in establishing validity.   
  Predictive validity.  Perceptions of status discrepancies and upward contempt should 
theoretically be related given that upward contempt is rooted in identifying differences between 
groups in a social hierarchy.  Participants’ acknowledgement of status discrepancies was 
significantly related to their feelings of upward contempt toward heterosexual people, r(369) = 
.39, p < .001.  That is, the extent to which people perceive differences in societal status between 
LGBQ and heterosexual people is positively related to their reported feelings of upward 
contempt. 
  Convergent and discriminant validity.  In a preliminary investigation of convergent 
and discriminant validity, I examined correlations between other common emotions and the 
Upward Contempt Scale, with high and low correlations serving as evidence of convergent and 
discriminant validity, respectively.   
  First, using the 24 emotion items, I organized the emotions into positive and negative 
scales (as commonly used in previous research; e.g., Conley & Rabinowitz, 2004; Mackinnon et 
al., 1999).  The Positive Emotion Scale was comprised of six items (α = .86; inspired, 
enthusiastic, happy, comfortable, love, and positive).  Eighteen items created the Negative 
Emotion Scale (α = .95; jealous, envious, suspicious, afraid, upset, nervous, hurt, judged, 
distressed, frustrated, angry, resentful, pity, fear, hatred, disdain, negative, and disgust).  As 
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presented in Table 1.3, upward contempt was negatively associated with positive emotions and 
positively associated with negative emotions.  Next, I examined the relationships between the 24 
emotion items and upward contempt; the magnitude of significant correlations ranged from .11 
(envious) to .43 (suspicious) for the negative items and from -.15 (enthusiastic) to -.24 (love) for 
the positive items.  Given the size of the correlations, for both the total positive and negative 
scales and their individual items, it appears that there is a stronger link between upward contempt 
and negative affect than with positive affect.  Future studies with the Upward Contempt Scale 
should continue to examine relationships between upward contempt and extant measures that are 
theoretically similar and different from the construct. 
  Finally, I tested the relationship between the new Upward Contempt Scale and a measure 
of social desirability.  The relationship between upward contempt and the social desirability 
measure was not significant.  In other words, self-reported feelings of upward contempt are not 
significantly influenced by people’s desire to behave in a culturally appropriate manner (i.e., to 
appear non-prejudiced); however, there was a significant relationship between social desirability 
and the subscale of unwarranted status, r(369) = -.16, p < .001.  People who provide socially 
desirable responses tend to provide lower ratings on the unwarranted status subscale, which 
assesses participants’ beliefs that heterosexual people’s social standing is unwarranted.  
However, the Upward Contempt Scale, as a whole, does not appear to be vulnerable to social 
desirability bias. 
Subsample Differences  
I tested if participants differed in their feelings of upward contempt as a function of 
gender, sexual orientation (lesbian, gay, bisexual), age, and student status.  For clarity, I 
conducted separate tests to compare means of upward contempt based on demographic groups. 
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Given the low subsample size, I excluded the 23 trans-identified participants from the 
gender analysis and only compared those who identified as men (n =137) to people who 
identified as women (n = 181).  No gender differences emerged in participants’ feelings of 
upward contempt, t(316) = 0.40, p = .69.  Next, I conducted a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to test for differences as a function of sexual orientation (lesbian, gay, and bisexual) 
and there was no effect of sexual orientation on upward contempt, F(2, 332) = .88, p = .41.   
Lastly, given that people have unique experiences with heterosexual people and different 
sources of stress associated with their LGBQ identities across the lifespan (e.g., D'Augelli & 
Grossman, 2001; Dyson et al., 2003), it is expected that there might be age differences in 
feelings of upward contempt toward heterosexual people.  Although age was not significantly 
related to upward contempt [r(369) = -.03, p = .622], participants who were currently 
undergraduate students reported greater upward contempt (M = 4.58; SD = 0.97) than those who 
were not currently students (M = 4.23; SD = 0.99), t(369) = 2.92, p = .004.  This pattern of 
students reporting greater upward contempt than non-students was found on both the 
unwarranted status subscale [t(369) = 2.20, p = .029] and the minorities’ superiority subscale 
[t(369) = 2.57, p = .011]. 
In sum, there were no differences in upward contempt in terms of gender, sexual 
orientation, and age; however, students did hold more upward contempt toward heterosexual 
people than non-students. 
Discussion 
 The current study accomplished the main goal of establishing a set of items to measure 
upward contempt.  The items used to evaluate upward contempt were inspired by empirical and 
cultural observations of intergroup processes from LGBQ people’s perspectives, as well as from 
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theoretical discussions of upward contempt (Ben-Ze'ev, 2001; W. I. Miller, 1995, 1997).  A 
three-factor solution initially emerged to organize the latent structure of the upward contempt 
measure; however, upon further scrutiny, the third factor was dropped in favor a two-factor 
framework that will provide greater external validity and include fewer items to reduce 
participant fatigue.  Although the third factor was meaningful and covers one of the many 
aspects of upward contempt as discussed in the literature, its content may be more susceptible to 
changing social norms and contains ambiguous meaning (e.g., the item “Heterosexuals’ values 
are inessential” does not specify the ways in which these values might be inessential).  
Moreover, with the nation-wide legalization of same-sex marriage in the United States in 2015, 
same-sex couples have greater access to adopt the values that were once associated with 
heterosexual people (i.e., marriage, family, children).  It is unclear how LGBQ participants 
would respond to these items with a changing social landscape in which certain values and 
traditions are no longer exclusively heterosexual.  According to queer theorists, the legalization 
of same-sex marriage renders LGBQ people to the same norms and standards of heterosexuals 
(see Barker, 2013; Moon, 2010; Warner, 1999), thus, the lines between heterosexual values and 
queer values may blur as LGBQ people assimilate.  Furthermore, the third factor was very 
specific to the dynamics between LGBQ people and heterosexual people.  If the Upward 
Contempt Scale is adapted to be used in research with other low and high status groups, the third 
factor might have little relevance.  One possible solution would be to develop various versions of 
a third factor of the Upward Contempt Scale that applies to more than one social group (i.e., 
addressing values related to sexual orientation, race, social class within separate subscales); thus, 
researchers would be able to incorporate a third subscale based on the fit for their participants. 
 The final two-factor solution (Upward Contempt Scale; 16 items) yielded eight items per 
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subscale: minorities’ superiority (beliefs that the low status group is superior to the high status 
group in various ways) and unwarranted status (beliefs that the high status group’s status is 
unjustified).  Participants’ acknowledgement of status discrepancies between heterosexual and 
LGBQ people predicted their feelings of upward contempt, and the Upward Contempt Scale and 
negative affect were correlated to a greater extent than upward contempt related to positive 
affect.  Importantly, people’s reported feelings of upward contempt did not fall prey to social 
desirability bias.  There were no differences in feelings of upward contempt as a function of 
gender, sexual orientation, or age; however, students were more likely to hold upward contempt 
toward heterosexual people than non-students.  There were too few queer- and trans-identified 
people in the sample to include them in the subsample comparisons of sexual orientation and 
gender.  Given that queer-identities are known as the “liberal left” of the lesbian and gay 
community (Ward, 2015), people who identify as queer and, presumably critique heterosexuality 
to a greater extent than lesbian- and gay-identified people, may hold stronger feelings of upward 
contempt toward heterosexual people than those who identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. 
Limitations and Future Directions  
  The next step for developing the Upward Contempt Scale is to perform a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA).  Given the current sample size, I chose not to perform the confirmatory 
factor analysis with these data.  With a larger sample size, a sample can be split randomly in half 
and the two samples can then be used to conduct parallel analyses with PAF and CFA 
(Krzystofiak, Cardy, & Newman, 1988).  Hoelter (1983) and Weston and Gore (2006) 
recommend having minimum sample sizes of 200 for submitting items to PAF and CFA.  After 
excluding participants who did not fit the survey criteria, this study’s final sample included 371 
participants, which yields two sample sizes of 185.  Although CFA is possible with these data, it 
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is highly recommended that replication studies use independent samples to perform CFA to 
avoid producing sample-specific factors (as suggested by Krzystofiak et al., 1988).  Therefore, 
another study will provide me with the opportunity to confirm the factor solution and to test 
additional validity variables for upward contempt. 
  As with all new measures, ongoing psychometric testing is necessary.  This study 
provides insight into upward contempt’s relationship to a large range of emotions.  Because there 
were no strong correlations between the upward contempt measure and the 24 emotions 
included, we can conclude that, though it is related to other emotions, it is not identical to LGBQ 
people’s other feelings toward heterosexual people.  Additional measures are needed to 
formulate a more comprehensive nomological network for upward contempt that continues to 
test convergent and discriminant validity, as well as concurrent validity.  Specifically, concurrent 
validity of the measure will help to establish that upward contempt is a low status group process.  
That is, high status group members should score differently than low status group members on 
this measure; thus, the scale should be powerful enough to differentiate high status and low 
status group members who complete the measure.   
  Although there is a dearth of research on minority groups’ attitudes toward dominant 
groups, testing upward contempt’s relationship to the following will strengthen convergent and 
discriminant validity: measures of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (i.e., the extent to 
which people favor the ingroup and denigrate the outgroup, respectively; Allport, 1954; Brewer, 
1999, 2007), the Attitudes toward Heterosexuals Scale (e.g., "I prefer to be friends with straight 
people;" Vaughn & Teeters, 2015), a measure of internalized homophobia (e.g., "Social 
situations with gay/lesbian people make me feel uncomfortable;" Ross & Rosser, 1996), stigma 
consciousness (e.g., "Most heterosexuals have a lot more homophobic thoughts than they 
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actually express;" Pinel, 1999), and system justification (e.g., “All in all, the world is a balanced 
place;” Kay & Jost, 2003).  Feelings of upward contempt should be similar to favoring the 
ingroup, holding negative attitudes toward heterosexuals, and experiencing less internalized 
homophobia, greater stigma consciousness, and greater resistance to the social hierarchy.  
  Another avenue for future research is to consider how upward contempt might operate 
with other minority groups.  Miller discussed the upward contempt that people of lower 
socioeconomic status’ hold toward wealthy individuals (e.g., blue-collared workers’ attitudes 
toward middle-upper class people; W. I. Miller, 1995).  One promising future direction is to test 
upward contempt within dynamics based on socioeconomic status.  In addition, upward contempt 
may be held by Black Americans toward white Americans, employees toward employers (see 
Pelzer, 2005), and people of various religious and political orientations toward their dominant 
counterparts.  The possible contexts in which upward contempt may function are abundant.  
  Future research with the Upward Contempt Scale should investigate the role that upward 
contempt plays in intergroup relations and in LGBQ health.  Specifically, more research is 
needed to identify individual differences in upward contempt, contextual factors that play a role 
in upward contempt, and the theoretical and applied implications of upward contempt.  For 
example, predictors such as education, activism, and engagement in non-assimilationist queer 
politics might differently predict people’s feelings of upward contempt.  In terms of contextual 
and situational factors, upward contempt might emerge as a psychological response to anti-gay 
contexts rather than identity-affirming contexts.  In general, the Upward Contempt Scale will 
offer new ways of thinking about LGBQ perspectives and experiences.  Lastly, research should 
examine how upward contempt fits into pre-existing frameworks of LGBQ identity and health 
(e.g., the minority stress model; Meyer, 2003)— feelings of upward contempt may be related to 
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minority stress, which is negatively associated with psychological and physical health outcomes 
(Duncan & Hatzenbuehler, 2014; Frost, 2011; Hatzenbuehler, 2009; Huebner & Davis, 2007; 
Major et al., 2013). 
Conclusion 
  The upward contempt scale and its two dimensions contain strong reliability, normal 
distributions, and preliminary evidence of construct validity.  Future research should confirm the 
two-factor solution and continue to validate the scale.  Once validated, the measure can be used 
as a stand-alone tool or in conjunction with other psychological instruments.  In particular, the 
Upward Contempt Scale has implications for intergroup relations research that seeks to examine 
minority groups’ perspectives and for research on LGBQ people’s identities, stress, attitudes, and 
experiences. 
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Similar to Study 1, I focus on minority groups’ perceptions of dominant groups in Study 
2.  I investigate one area of intergroup relations from the minority perspective: stereotypes.  
Building on results from Matsick and Conley (2016), I test how stereotypes about heterosexuals 
affect LGBQ people’s psychological well-being.  Although Matsick and Conley (2016) 
established that stereotypes about heterosexual people are known and held by LGBQ people, it is 
unclear how LGBQ people experience stereotypes about heterosexuals.  Put simply, we know 
that stereotypes about heterosexual people exist, but we know little about what stereotypes do for 
LGBQ people beyond serving basic cognitive purposes (e.g., saving cognitive resources by 
processing information quickly at the group-level rather than individual-level; Allport, 1954; 
Diehl & Jonas, 1991; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; D. T. Gilbert & Hixon, 1991).  Stereotype 
functionality has long been of interest to social psychologists (see Stangor & Schaller, 1996); 
however, our knowledge about stereotype functionality is largely developed from observing the 
behaviors of dominant groups or intergoup dynamics among randomly assigned groups in 
controlled laboratory experiments.  Answering Cox et al.’s (2012) call for researchers to explore 
new functions of stereotyping (e.g., using outgroup derogation to increase self-esteem; Fein & 
Spencer, 1997), this study aims to address the purpose of stereotypes from the minority 
standpoint.   
Groups have a basic instinct to engage in self-categorization, that is, to perceive 
themselves and others in terms of group membership (e.g.,  Brewer, 1991, 2007; Turner, 1987; 
CHAPTER 3: (Study 2) Stereotypes about Heterosexuals and LGBQ People’s Well-Being 
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Turner & Oakes, 1989).  The categorization of people into an ingroup and outgroup allows 
ingroup members to differentiate from the outgroup and unite over shared values and identities 
with other ingroup members (as explained by social identity theory; see Tajfel & Turner, 2004).  
Queer history, in particular, is filled with ways in which LGBQ people willingly differentiate 
themselves from heterosexual people.  For example, atypical gender performance, celebrations of 
queer pride, political resistance, and non-assimilation perspectives within LGBQ communities 
are some of the many ways in which LGBQ differentiate their ingroup from the dominant 
outgroup (e.g., Butler, 1990; Halperin & Traub, 2010; G. Rubin, 1984; Warner, 1999).  Although 
not many social psychological theories to my knowledge have been used to explain queer history 
and LGBQ people’s experiences, it is highly likely that LGBQ people indeed engage in self-
categorization and group differentiation; these intergroup processes have even been documented 
within minimal group paradigms (e.g., among groups with minimal or abitrary differences; 
Brewer, 1979; Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).   
When group differentiation occurs, people tend to favor their ingroup and, sometimes, 
this form of ingroup bias is accomplished through outgroup derogation, especially when the 
ingroup perceives the outgroup as threatening or as a hindrance to an ingroup’s goals 
(Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Brewer, 1999; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Voci, 
2006).  Outgroup stereotypes provide ingroups with the opportunity to positively differentiate 
themselves from outgroup stereotypes (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Forgas, 1981).  Thus, stereotypes 
about dominant outgroups can be thought of as a proxy for ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
derogation among minority ingroups— outgroup stereotypes reinforce group differentiation, and, 
given that stereotypes about heterosexuals position heterosexual people in a negative light and 
LGBQ people in a positive light (Matsick & Conley, 2016a), outgroup stereotypes perpetuate 
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ingroup favoritism among LGBQ people.  That is, outgroup stereotypes can be used to 
differentiate groups while bolstering the ingroup.  Moreover, there are psychological rewards for 
engaging in ingroup favoritism.  As a result of favoring the ingroup and derogating the outgroup, 
ingroup members experience more positive psychological outcomes related to their group 
membership (e.g., greater self-esteem and pride about group membership; Fein & Spencer, 1997; 
Lemyre & Smith, 1985; M. Rubin & Hewstone, 1998) and are perceived more positively by 
other ingroup members (Castelli & Carraro, 2010).  Thus, not only do outgroup stereotypes 
provide a way to differentiate groups, but also it yields psychological benefits. 
In this study, I examine LGBQ-identified participants’ psychological well-being after 
they are presented with stereotypes about a dominant outgroup (heterosexual people).  Drawing 
on theories of intergroup behavior, I predict that individuals who are exposed to heterosexual 
stereotypes will experience more positive psychological outcomes than those in the control 
group.  Testing the effect of outgroup stereotypes on an ingroup’s well-being is an especially 
important research aim with LGBQ people given the psychological burden and stress that 
members of LGBQ communities endure based on their group membership.   
Methods 
Participants 
I recruited participants using the same recruitment procedures outlined in Study 1.  
Participants were recruited into an online survey entitled, “Online Research Study: The Social 
Attitudes and Reactions of LGBQ People.”  Participants confirmed that they had access to sound 
on their computers before they were directed into the study.  All participants who provided 
contact information were entered into a raffle to win $25 Amazon.com gift cards, and twenty 
participants were re-contacted to receive compensation.   
 		 40 
The sample (N = 146) consisted of 32 lesbian women, 23 gay men, 74 bisexual 
individuals (69% female), and 17 queer individuals (76% female).  Ninety-five participants 
identified as women, 37 as men, and 14 identified as genderqueer, genderless, or transgender.  
The average age was 25 years old (ages ranging from 17 to 66 years); 52% of participants were 
undergraduate students.  Seventy-three percent of the sample identified as European 
American/White, 8% as multiracial, 6% as Asian American, 5% as Latina/o, 5% as African 
American/Black, 3% as Native American, and 1% of participants did not report their ethnicity.  
Forty-four percent resided in the Midwestern part of the United States, 32% in the Northeast, 
11% in the West, 6% in the Southwest, 3% in the Southeast, and 4% currently lived in Canada. 
Design and Procedure 
 After agreeing to participate in the study, participants were randomly assigned to watch 
one of two videos in order to evaluate the videos for quality.  In one video, actors provided 
stereotypes about heterosexual people and the actors in the other video conveyed stereotypes 
about LGBQ people.  The same actors participated in both videos and presented the stereotypes 
in the same light— in both videos, the actors exaggerated the stereotypes and included some 
degree of humor in their delivery.  Participants completed the survey measures and the 
demographics questionnaire that was used in Study 1.  The study, including time spent watching 
the video, took most participants 12-15 minutes to complete.  All materials were presented 
through Qualtrics Survey Software, including the embedded videos. 
Experimental Manipulation 
Media, community conversations, satire, and humor are some of the ways in which 
minority groups can safely express their thoughts about and attitudes toward the dominant group 
(Hart, 2004; Scott, 1990).  Over the past five years, members of marginalized groups have 
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created videos with other ingroup members to recapture their daily realities; for example, 
numerous videos exist to expose microaggressions that people face and how minority groups are 
treated by dominant groups.  The videos have become widely popular with over millions of 
views on the Internet (e.g., “Stuff White People Say to Black Girls,” “If Black People Said the 
Stuff that White People Say,” “Stuff that Straight Girls Say”).  In general, these videos 
exaggerate the thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors of the outgroup, but nonetheless, are effective 
in poking fun at the dominant group through the eyes of minority group members. 
To operationalize stereotypes about heterosexuals, I created similar videos for the 
purpose of this study.  First, I turned to previous research to identify commonly-held stereotypes 
about each of the following groups: heterosexual men, heterosexual women, gay men, and 
lesbian women (see Fingerhut & Peplau, 2006; Geiger, Harwood, & Hummert, 2006; Madon, 
1997; Matsick & Conley, 2016a).  I created a list of stereotypes that reflected what participants 
had said in previous studies.  Nine researchers (seven of whom were members of the LGBQ 
community) reviewed these stereotypes and selected 24 stereotypes about heterosexual people 
that were easily translated into statements and were highly gendered (a component of 
heterosexual stereotypes identified by Matsick & Conley, 2016a).  Next, the research team and I 
selected 24 stereotypes about lesbian and gay people that were perceived as the most commonly-
heard within the LGBQ community and, importantly, would not be seen as overly offensive to 
members of the LGBQ community (e.g., lesbian women are good at fixing things should be a 
relatively benign stereotype compared to stereotypes about perversion).  In other words, we 
attempted to select stereotypes that were relatively harmless in comparison to some of the more 
critical stereotypes about LGBQ people.  The goal was to design two group-level videos that 
were somewhat humorous and light-hearted, even though they contained stereotypes.   
 		 42 
I recruited three women and two men to act in the video as lesbian- and gay-identified 
individuals.  In the video entitled “Stuff that Straight People Say… (According to LGBQ 
Folks),” the actresses delivered 12 statements regarding heterosexual women and the actors read 
12 statements regarding heterosexual men.  In the video entitled “Stuff that Gay and Queer 
People Say… (According to LGBQ Folks),” the actresses and actors each performed 12 
statements regarding lesbian women and gay men, respectively.  Both videos incorporated 
ingroup humor based on sexual orientation.  The order of actors presented and the lengths of 
video were controlled across both conditions; see Appendix B for the full list of statements used 
in both video conditions. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to view one of two videos (hosted on 
YouTube.com).  Seventy-four participants viewed the stereotypes about the LGBQ community 
video (control) and 72 participants viewed the stereotypes about heterosexual people video 
(outgroup stereotypes).  Immediately following the video, participants rated the video on pre-
testing items; they indicated on five-point scales how funny, entertaining, attractive, likeable, 
interesting, amusing, and appealing they found the videos and the people in the videos.  There 
were no significant differences between perceptions of the videos on these pre-testing items 
(ts(144) ≤ |1.29|, all p-values > .20).   
Participants also responded to the item, “How do LGBQ people look for making this 
video?” on a scale of 1 (Not Very Good) to 5 (Very Good); there were no differences between the 
responses of those in the control condition (M = 4.88; SD = 1.09) and those in the heterosexual 
stereotypes video condition (M = 4.63; SD = 1.35), t(144) = 0.70, p = .483.  However, 
participants perceived the heterosexual stereotypes video as more accurate (M = 3.22; SD = 1.09) 
than the control video (M = 2.67; SD = 1.17), t(144) = -2.99, p = .003.  Participants also 
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perceived the heterosexual stereotypes video as less offensive to the LGBQ community (M = 
2.53; SD = 1.19) than the control video (M = 3.03; SD = 1.13), t(144) = 2.60, p = .01.  However, 
given the low means on the five-point scale, participants did not appear to perceive either video 
as highly offensive. 
Measures 
After viewing the video and responding to items regarding the quality of the video, 
participants completed the psychological measures of well-being and group esteem.  See 
Appendix C for a complete list of items used in this study. 
Psychological well-being.  To measure participants’ psychological well-being after 
exposure to stereotypes, I created a set of 11 items on six-point semantic differential scales: 
ashamed/proud, inferior/equal, discouraged/encouraged, disrespected/respected, 
afraid/unafraid, unsafe/safe, rejected/accepted, threatened/affirmed, stigmatized/supported, 
alone/close to others, and strong/vulnerable (reverse-scored).  Using the aforementioned scales, 
participants were asked to indicate how they felt “right now, at this very moment.”  Greater 
numbers indicate greater psychological well-being. 
I conducted a principal axis factor analysis with orthogonal (varimax) rotation on the 11 
items.   Prior to extracting factors, I determined that the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test of 
sampling adequacy was sufficient (.92; a value between .5-1.0 suggests that patterns of 
correlations are compact and the sampling size is adequate; Kaiser, 1970, 1974) and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity was significant, x2(55) = 839.06, p < .001.  Multicollinearity was not an issue 
(R determinant = .003).  The procedure extracted a one-factor solution, with an eigenvalue 
greater of 5.84 (the scree plot’s point of inflexion also supported the decision to retain only one 
factor).  Factor loadings ranged from .41-.86 and the factor accounted for 53% of the variance.  
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The 11 items were averaged to create a scale with high internal consistency (α = .91) in which 
greater numbers reflect positive psychological well-being. 
Collective self-esteem.  Nine items measured participants’ group-based self-esteem, or 
the extent to which a participant perceived her/his sexual identity to be a positive aspect of the 
self (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).  I adapted the original 9 items of the Collective Self-Esteem 
Scale to address LGBQ community membership on six-point scales (1 = Strongly Disagree, 6 = 
Strongly Agree; α = .82).  Example items included: “I make a positive contribution to the LGBQ 
community” and “I’m glad I belong to the LGBQ community.”  The instructions asked 
participants to indicate their agreement with the items in terms of their feelings “right now, at 
this very moment.” 
Happiness.  Lastly, I assessed general feelings of happiness with being LGBQ.  The 
survey instructed participants to consider how they felt “right now, at this very moment” while 
completing the survey.  Participants responded on a ten-point sliding scale (1 = Not at All, 10 = 
Extremely) to the single-item measure, “I feel happy to be LGBQ.”  
Results 
  I conducted an independent-samples t-test to test the effect of heterosexual stereotypes on 
LGBQ people’s psychological outcomes.  Next, I tested whether participants’ responses varied 
as a function gender, sexual orientation, and student status.  
Effect of Video Condition on Psychological Outcomes 
As predicted, stereotypes about heterosexuals affected LGBQ people’s well-being.  
Participants in the heterosexual stereotypes condition felt greater well-being (M = 4.41; SD = 
0.96) than participants in the LGBQ stereotypes (control) condition (M = 3.93; SD = 0.96), 
t(144) = -2.97, p = .004.  Participants who watched the heterosexual stereotypes video also 
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reported greater happiness (i.e., “I feel happy to be LGBQ;” M = 9.09; SD = 1.23) than those 
who watched the LGBQ stereotypes video (M = 8.26; SD = 1.85), t(125.55) = -3.16, p = .002.  
Taken together, the effect of video condition on participants’ psychological well-being and 
happiness confirm that stereotypes about heterosexual people influence the psychological 
outcomes of LGBQ people.   
In contrast, there was no effect of video condition on participants’ collective self-esteem, 
t(144) = -0.75, p = .452.  Participants in both conditions reported high collective self-esteem 
(heterosexual stereotypes video: M = 4.44, SD = 0.72; LGBQ stereotypes video: M = 4.35, SD = 
0.81).  It is possible that the content of the collective self-esteem measure covers stable, trait-like 
qualities than more flexible, state-like outcomes that are susceptible to context; that is, it is 
unlikely that participants would vary their responses to items from mere exposure to a video 
(e.g., “I make a positive contribution to the LGBQ community”).  See Table 2.1 for means and 
standard deviations for all outcomes tested in Study 2. 
Subsample Differences 
I aimed to test whether participants’ gender (women, men), sexual orientation (lesbian, 
gay, bisexual), and student status (student, non-student) affected their well-being and happiness 
and whether the video condition effect varied by these demographic factors.  
There were too few men per cell to test gender differences (there were less than 20 men 
per condition).  However, the sample sizes permitted me to conduct a 2 (condition) x 2 (sexual 
orientation) factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test for sexual orientation differences on 
psychological well-being and happiness and to test whether the video condition effect varied as a 
function of sexual orientation.  I excluded queer-identified participants from this analysis and, 
due to the low sample size of gay men, I combined lesbian women and gay men to compare their 
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responses to those of bisexual participants (i.e., those with an orientation exclusively directed 
toward members of the same-sex versus those with orientations that recognize attraction to 
different-sex people; lesbian and gay, n = 121; bisexual, n = 69).  The results confirmed there 
was no effect of sexual orientation on participants’ reported well-being [F(1, 125) = .04, p = 
.901] or happiness [F(1, 123) = 1.90, p = .171] and there were no significant interactions 
between condition and sexual orientation on well-being [F(1, 125) = 1.00, p = .759] or happiness 
[F(1, 123) = 0.48, p = .492]. 
For ease of interpretation, a separate factorial ANOVA [2 (condition) x 2 (student)] tested 
whether there was a main effect of student status on psychological well-being and happiness, 
given that students differed from non-students in Study 1.  In Study 2, student status was a not a 
significant predictor of well-being [F(1, 141) = .43, p = .513] and happiness [F(1, 139) = .05, p = 
.83] and there was no significant interaction between video condition and student status on well-
being [F(1, 141) = .50, p = .481] or happiness [F(1, 139) = .31, p = .582].   
Overall, there is no evidence to suggest that the effect of video condition varies by 
participant gender, sexual orientation, or student status; however, due to the low representation 
of gay and bisexual men in the sample, these results should be interpreted with caution.   
Discussion 
In the current study, I tested how LGBQ people respond to stereotypes about 
heterosexual people.  Until recently, the content of heterosexual stereotypes and its influence on 
LGBQ people were uncharted areas of inquiry.  The current study provides insight into how 
dominant group (heterosexual) stereotypes affect minority group members (LGBQ people).  
After exposure to a video that reflected sexual minorities’ stereotypes about heterosexual people, 
LGBQ participants felt greater feelings of happiness and well-being (e.g., pride, respect, 
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affirmation) than those who were exposed to another set of stereotypes (i.e., stereotypes about 
LGBQ people).  Across conditions, participants were generally happy and had positive self-
esteem about their identities.  Recall that participants perceived the videos that delivered the sets 
of stereotypes as equally amusing, likeable, and entertaining; therefore, the effect of the 
condition is not because participants merely liked the heterosexual stereotypes more than the 
LGBQ stereotypes (control).  Contrary to my hypothesis, outgroup stereotypes did not affect 
participants’ collective self-esteem.   
Taken together, greater psychological well-being and happiness with being LGBQ after 
exposure to heterosexual stereotypes suggest that stereotypes about dominant outgroups yield 
positive psychological outcomes among minority ingroups.  Given the effect on happiness and 
well-being with one’s LGBQ identity, it is possible that minorities can use dominant group 
stereotypes to relieve minority stress (i.e., the stress of having LGBQT people’s values, 
experiences, and identities devalued in society; Meyer, 2003).  In this vein, we might be quick to 
conclude that stereotypes are good for people, but this is a premature conclusion.  Stereotypes 
about dominant groups might not be a suggested, healthy strategy to reduce stress— in the same 
way that we would not promote alcohol or smoking to relieve stress— however, minorities might 
draw on stereotypes about dominant groups when they need to protect or preserve their ingroup.  
That is, if stereotyping the dominant outgroup boosts solidarity and well-being among a minority 
ingroup, minority group members might be inclined to use dominant group stereotypes for their 
own psychological benefit.  As such, stereotypes about heterosexuals might not be fair, accurate, 
or healthy for building positive intergroup relations, but they may be part of an adaptive strategy 
used to resist threats to the ingroup (e.g., heterosexism, anti-gay prejudice, stigma, and minority 
stress). 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
The current study is limited by the use of the collective self-esteem scale.  The collective 
self-esteem scale is more often used as a predictor (e.g., Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & 
Broadmax, 1994; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) than as an outcome (cf. Branscombe & Wann, 
1994; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997).  In other words, people’s scores on the scale might be 
relatively stable, which explains why there was little variability on this measure between 
conditions.  In fact, Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) conclude that collective self-esteem is an 
individual difference factor that moderates people’s desire to present the ingroup in a favorable 
light.  Future research could address this limitation by including a more thorough social identity 
measure that is better equipped to address contextual changes to group-esteem (e.g., “Right now, 
I have little respect for my group;” Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999).   
Another limitation to this research is that the control group (i.e., people who watched the 
LGBQ stereotypes video) might differ from people’s baseline wellness and happiness; therefore, 
they may not be a true control group.  The motivation behind including the LGBQ stereotypes 
video, as opposed to having no video in the control condition, was that I wanted the control to be 
as similar to the experimental condition as possible.  In other words, I did not want any potential 
effect to be due to the experience of watching a video that incorporates group-based humor.  
Further, as noted by participants in the comments section of the survey, the stereotypes in the 
control condition (LGBQ stereotypes) focused on lesbian women and gay men.  Those with non-
lesbian and non-gay identities may have felt that the control group video was actually conveying 
outgroup stereotypes (the outgroup, in this case, being lesbian- and gay-identified people).  The 
inclusion of another condition that does not incorporate any group’s stereotypes will help to 
confirm the findings from this study.   
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Finally, future research should investigate factors that moderate or mediate the effect of 
dominant outgroup stereotypes on minority group’s psychological well-being.  For example, 
ingroup favoritism may moderate the relationship—that is, stereotypes about dominant 
outgroups may cause minority groups to feel positively about themselves among those who have 
a stronger inclination to favor and preserve their own group.  Furthermore, research should 
examine the relationship between dominant group stereotypes and feelings of upward contempt 
(i.e., contempt for and disapproval of dominant groups).  It is plausible that feelings of upward 
contempt mediate the relationship between stereotypes of dominant groups and minority groups’ 
well-being, such that heterosexual stereotypes predict LGBQ people’s well-being because 
heterosexual stereotypes elicit upward contempt among LGBQ people.  This hypothesis follows 
the logic posed by W. I. Miller (1995) that upward contempt is experienced as a positive emotion 
because it allows minorities to reclaim superiority; thus, I would expect that upward contempt is 
related to positive outcomes for minorities.  Understanding how upward contempt relates to 
minority groups’ stereotypes and attitudes toward dominant groups will help to further define 
upward contempt for researchers to use in the study of intergroup relations.         
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The goal of this study is to refine the effect examined in Study 2.  While Study 2 
provided a test of outgroup stereotypes on well-being, the control task (i.e., a video of LGBQ 
stereotypes) may have affected participants’ well-being.  The inclusion of an additional control 
group will determine the legitimacy of the effect.  Further, the relationship between stereotypes 
about heterosexuals and LGBQ people’s feelings of upward contempt could not be addressed 
with the data collected in Study 2; therefore, I included the Upward Contempt Scale in this study 
to contribute to Study 1’s goal of understanding upward contempt’s psychological properties.  
As in Study 2, I hypothesize that (a) stereotypes about heterosexual people will cause 
LGBQ people to experience positive psychological outcomes and (b) people who watch the 
LGBQ stereotypes video (as used in Study 2) will not significantly differ from a true control 
group (participants who are not exposed to any stereotypes about any group).  Another goal of 
this study is to explore the relationships between upward contempt, stereotypes about the 
outgroup, and psychological well-being among members of minority groups.   
Methods 
Participants 
I recruited participants with the same procedures used in Study 1.  Participants were 
recruited into an online survey entitled, “Online Research Study: The Social Attitudes and 
Reactions of LGBQ People.”  Participants confirmed that they had access to sound on their 
computers before starting the study.  All participants who provided contact information at the 
CHAPTER 4: (Study 3) Heterosexual Stereotypes Affect LGBQ People’s Well-being
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end of the study were entered into a raffle to win $25 Amazon.com gift cards.  Twenty 
participants were re-contacted to receive compensation.   
Prior to data analysis, the following participants were excluded: five participants were 
removed for identifying as heterosexual, five for admitting that they did not watch the video or 
pay attention to the video used in some of the conditions, and three were removed because they 
had indicated they did not take the survey seriously.  The final sample (N = 221) consisted of 65 
lesbian women, 55 gay men, 79 bisexual individuals (63% female), 22 queer individuals (36% 
female).  Fifty-five percent of the sample identified as women, 31% as men, and 9% identified as 
transgender, and 5% identified their gender identity as genderqueer, genderless, or nonbinary.  
The average age was 33 years old (age ranged from 18 to 69 years); 22% of participants were 
currently undergraduate students at the time of the survey.  Seventy-two percent of the sample 
identified as European American/White, 9% as multiracial, 6% as Latina/o, 6% as African 
American/Black, 3% as Native American, 2% as Asian American, and 2% of participants did not 
report their ethnicity.  Thirty-six percent resided in the Northeastern part of the United States, 
26% in the Midwest, 15% in the West, 8% in the Southwest, 7% in the Southeast, 4% currently 
lived in another country (specifically, the United Kingdom or Canada), and 4% did not report 
their geographic region. 
Design and Procedure 
After agreeing to participate in the study, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions: LGBQ stereotypes (n = 76), heterosexual stereotypes (n = 91), or no 
stereotypes (n = 54).3  All participants completed the survey measures and a demographics 
questionnaire.  The study took most participants 12-15 minutes to complete and all materials 
were presented through Qualtrics Survey Software. 
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Experimental Manipulation 
In the LGBQ stereotypes condition, participants watched a video of LGBQ people 
presenting stereotypes about LGBQ people.  In the heterosexual stereotypes condition, 
participants watched a video of LGBQ people presenting stereotypes about heterosexual people.  
In the control condition, participants did not watch a video.  See Study 2 or Appendix B for more 
information about the videos.   
Those who watched a video responded to six statements about the video.  Participants 
rated the videos as equally entertaining, likeable, and funny (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly 
Agree; ts(149) ≤ |1.06|, all p-values > .290).  Across conditions, participants were also equally 
likely to agree with the following: “I was offended by the video,” “Other LGBQ people would 
enjoy watching the video,” and “I would share this video with my friends who identify as 
LGBQ” (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree; ts(149) ≤ |0.99|, all p-values > .324).  In 
sum, though the content and target group of each video was different, there were no significant 
differences in participants’ general perceptions of the heterosexual stereotypes video and LGBQ 
stereotypes video.  
Measures 
 For those in the LGBQ stereotypes and heterosexual stereotypes conditions, participants 
responded to all of the measures after the video portion of the survey (recall that those in the “no 
stereotypes” condition skipped the video segment).  The presentation of the measures was 
counterbalanced to avoid order effects.  See Appendix D for the complete list of measures used 
in Study 3.   
Psychological well-being.  To measure participants’ psychological well-being, I included 
the 11 semantic differential items from Study 2: ashamed/proud, inferior/equal, 
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discouraged/encouraged, disrespected/respected, afraid/unafraid, unsafe/safe, 
rejected/accepted, threatened/affirmed, stigmatized/supported, alone/close to others, and 
strong/vulnerable (reverse-scored).  Participants responded to the items on six-point scales based 
on how they felt “right now, at this very moment” while taking the survey.  As in Study 2, a 
scale comprised of the 11 items had high internal consistency (α = .92).  On this well-being 
scale, greater numbers reflect greater psychological well-being. 
Happiness.  I measured participants’ general feelings of happiness with being LGBQ.  
The survey instructed participants to consider how they felt “right now, at this very moment” 
while completing the survey.  Participants responded on a ten-point sliding scale (1 = Not at All, 
10 = Extremely) to the single-item measure, “I feel happy to be LGBQ.”   
Upward contempt.  Twenty-eight items measured participants’ feelings of upward 
contempt toward heterosexual people.  Participants were instructed to indicate their agreement 
with each statement on a seven-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree).  
Consistent with the results of the factor analysis conducted in Study 1, the upward contempt 
measure hereafter will be discussed as a 16 item measure (α = .87) with two subscales.  The 
minorities’ superiority subscale (α = .88; i.e., expressing perceived superiority over the high 
status group) and the unwarranted status subscale (α = .88; i.e., believing that the high status 
group is actually below the level in which it claims for itself) each included 8 items.  Greater 
numbers on the Upward Contempt Scale indicate greater feelings of upward contempt toward 
heterosexual people. 
Acknowledgement of status discrepancies.  Given that upward contempt requires a 
group to be lower in status than another group and for low status group members to be aware of 
the status difference between groups (W. I. Miller, 1995), I included a measure of 
 		 54 
acknowledging status discrepancies (as used in Study 1).  Five items were included to address 
participants’ acknowledgement of heterosexual people’s status relative to LGBQ people.  All 
items were presented on a seven-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree).  
Example items included: “Heterosexuals are more often in positions of power in society than 
LGBQ people” and “LGBQ and heterosexual people hold equal social status” (reverse-scored).  
The 5 items were combined into the Acknowledgement of Status Discrepancies Scale (α = .79).  
Greater numbers reflect greater acknowledgement of status discrepancies between heterosexual 
and LGBQ people. 
Affect.  As in Study 1, participants indicated the extent to which 24 emotions describe 
how they feel toward heterosexual people on a seven-point scale (1 = Definitely Not, 7 = 
Definitely).  Participants were instructed “to think carefully about their feelings toward 
heterosexual people as a group.”  I used the 24 emotions to create positive and negative emotion 
scales (as commonly used in previous research; e.g., Conley & Rabinowitz, 2004; Mackinnon et 
al., 1999; see Study 1).  The Positive Emotion Scale was comprised of six items (α = .83; 
inspired, enthusiastic, happy, comfortable, love, and positive).  Eighteen items created the 
Negative Emotion Scale (α = .95; jealous, envious, suspicious, afraid, upset, nervous, hurt, 
judged, distressed, frustrated, angry, resentful, pity, fear, hatred, disdain, negative, and disgust). 
Results 
First, I aimed to replicate Study 2’s results by testing the effect of video condition on 
psychological well-being and happiness with being LGBQ.  Next, I tested whether exposure to 
heterosexual stereotypes affects participants’ feelings of upward contempt toward heterosexual 
people.  I then assessed subsample differences based on participants’ gender, sexual orientation, 
and student status. 
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Effect of Video Condition on Psychological Outcomes 
Consistent with the results of Study 2, I expected a main effect of the video condition; 
specifically, LGBQ participants should feel more positive psychological outcomes after 
watching the heterosexual stereotypes video compared to participants in the control groups.  A 
one-way analysis of variance of confirmed this hypothesis (significant comparisons received a 
Bonferonni adjustment in post-hoc analyses).  Participants who watched the heterosexual 
stereotypes video felt greater well-being [F(2, 218) = 5.11, p = .007] and happiness [F(2, 218) = 
4.38, p = .014] than those who watched the LGBQ stereotypes video or did not watch a video.  
Importantly, participants’ responses in the LGBQ stereotypes condition did not significantly 
differ from those in the control (no video) condition in terms of well-being or happiness.  The 
replication of the video condition effect validates the original finding that stereotypes about 
heterosexual people influence LGBQ people’s psychological well-being.  See Table 3.1 for 
means and standard deviations.   
Analyses Related to Upward Contempt  
The video condition had no effect on participants’ feelings of upward contempt toward 
heterosexual people, F(2, 218) = 1.59, p = .207.  However, when looking at the subscales 
separately, there was a significant difference between conditions on the unwarranted status 
subscale [F(2, 218) = 3.02, p = .05], but not on the minorities’ superiority subscale [F(2, 218) = 
0.40, p = .673].  Those in the control condition (M = 5.19; SD = 0.99) scored significantly higher 
on the unwarranted status subscale than those in the heterosexual stereotypes condition (M = 
4.71; SD = 1.24). 
The inclusion of the Upward Contempt Scale, Acknowledgement of Status Scale, and 
positive and negative affect measures provided the opportunity to reexamine the relationships 
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between these measures as found in Study 1.  The results concerning these variables from Study 
1 are replicated in Study 3.  Consistent with the results of Study 1, participants’ 
acknowledgement of status discrepancies was significantly related to their feelings of upward 
contempt toward heterosexual people, r(219) = .45, p < .001.  As seen in Table 3.2, upward 
contempt was negatively associated with positive emotions [r(219) = -.26, p < .001] and 
positively associated with negative emotions [r(219) = .36, p < .001].   
Subsample Differences 
Given there were no differences between the LGBQ stereotypes condition and control 
condition on the outcomes of interest, yet participants in these two conditions were significantly 
different from those in the heterosexual stereotypes condition, all subsequent analyses will 
compare the heterosexual stereotypes condition to the no video condition and LGBQ stereotypes 
condition combined.  Combining those who watched the LGBQ stereotypes video with those 
who did not watch a video yields large enough cell sizes to test for subsample differences with 
sufficient subsample sizes in each condition.  The factor of gender included two categories 
(woman, man) and sexual orientation included three categories (lesbian, gay, bisexual).  The 
tests of subsample differences are conducted separately to include as many cases as possible in 
each test—for example, if gender and sexual orientation were entered as factors into the same 
step, queer-identified people would be removed from the entire analysis; in contrast, if gender 
and sexual orientation are examined separately, queer-identified people’s responses may be 
accounted for in the gender analysis if they identified as women or men. 
I conducted a 2 (condition) x 2 (gender) factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test 
for gender differences on psychological well-being and happiness and to test whether the video 
condition effect varied as a function of gender (women, n = 121; men, n = 69).  There was an 
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interaction between video condition and gender on well-being, indicating that the effect of 
stereotypes about heterosexuals is not the same for men and women, F(1, 186) = 6.66, p = .011.  
Men who were exposed to heterosexual stereotypes experienced greater well-being (M = 4.92; 
SD = 0.69) than men in the control condition (M = 4.09; SD = 1.02); however, exposure to 
outgroup stereotypes appeared to have little effect on women in the heterosexual stereotypes 
condition (M = 4.47; SD = 0.85) in comparison to women in the control condition (M = 4.42; SD 
= 1.07).  In terms of happiness, there was no interaction between stereotype condition and 
gender; however, there was a significant main effect of gender, such that women (M = 8.31; SD 
= 2.16) were happier with being LGBQ than men (M = 7.33; SD = 2.62), F(1, 186) = 7.40, p = 
.007. 
A 2 (condition) x 3 (sexual orientation) ANOVA was performed on well-being and 
happiness (lesbian, n = 65; gay, n = 55; bisexual, n = 79).  There was no significant interaction 
between the two factors; however, in addition to the video condition effect, there was a 
significant main effect of sexual orientation on well-being [F(2, 193) = 3.94, p = .021] and 
happiness [F(2, 193) = 4.76, p = .010].  Lesbian women reported significantly greater well-being 
(M = 4.63; SD = 0.91) than bisexual people (M = 4.20; SD = 1.04).  Lesbian participants also 
reported greater happiness (M = 8.66; SD = 2.12) than bisexual people (M = 7.43; SD = 2.53).  
Gay men were not significantly different from lesbian or bisexual participants in terms of their 
well-being (M = 4.55; SD = 1.03) and happiness (M = 7.82; SD = 2.26). 
Finally, given the differences found between students and non-students in Study 1, I 
examined the effect of student status on well-being and happiness in a 2 (condition) x 2 (student 
status) ANOVA (student, n = 49; non-student, n = 172).  There was no significant interaction 
between the two factors, but the main effect of student status approached significance on well-
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being [F(1, 217) = 3.49, p = .063] and there was a significant main effect of student status on 
happiness [F(1, 217) = 5.48, p = .02].  Non-students reported greater well-being (M = 4.50; SD = 
1.01) than students (M = 4.14; SD = 0.94), and non-students were happier with being LGBQ (M 
= 8.15; SD = 2.24) than students (M = 7.24; SD = 2.63).  These results should be interpreted with 
caution given the relatively low number of students in this study.  
Discussion 
In Study 3, I examined the relationship between heterosexual stereotypes and LGBQ 
people’s well-being.  This study is a significant contribution because, using these data, I 
replicated the effect found in Study 2 and, most importantly, I replicated Study 2’s effect using a 
new control group (the no stereotypes condition).  After exposure to LGBQ people’s stereotypes 
about heterosexual people, participants felt greater happiness and well-being (e.g., pride, respect, 
affirmation) than those who were not exposed to stereotypes about heterosexual people (i.e., 
either exposed to stereotypes about LGBQ people or no stereotypes).  However, there is evidence 
to suggest that individual differences may qualify this effect—in these data, gender of 
participants significantly interacted with the condition.  In particular, the effect appears to be 
exacerbated for men in the study compared to women.  Of note, sexual orientation did not 
significantly interact with the condition in Study 2 or in Study 3, although there were too few 
men in Study 2 to evaluate gender differences.  Future research should recruit enough 
participants to make comparisons between subsamples. 
Contrary to my hypothesis, there was no relationship between upward contempt and 
stereotypes about heterosexuals.  Perhaps upward contempt is a rather stable psychological 
experience that is not easily altered by experimental conditions.  In this case, upward contempt 
might be better used as an individual difference factor or moderator (tested before the 
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manipulation) in future research.  Moreover, it is possible that exposure to stereotypes about 
heterosexual people does not affect upward contempt, but endorsement of stereotypes about 
heterosexual people would predict LGBQ people’s feelings of upward contempt.  Future 
research should test these hypotheses to determine how upward contempt as an affective form of 
prejudice fits into a broader framework of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. 
As found in Study 1, upward contempt significantly correlated with the extent to which 
participants’ acknowledged status discrepancies between LGBQ and heterosexual people in both 
conditions.  It was also negatively associated with positive emotion and positively related to 
negative emotion.  Although less than one quarter of the participants were students, there were 
no differences between students and non-students in feelings of upward contempt, as found in 
Study 1.  Further examining upward contempt’s relationship to well-being is beyond the scope of 
the current study; however, future research should continue to investigate under which 
conditions upward contempt may relate to psychological well-being among LGBQ people. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
One limitation to the current study is that a single item measured happiness with being 
LGBQ.  Future research can address this limitation by using a more comprehensive measure of 
happiness, as well as including validated measures that might be related to happiness with being 
LGBQ (e.g., scales of group pride and measures of internalized homophobia).  The inclusion of 
multiple measures related to psychological health and well-being will allow researchers to test 
the ways in which outgroup stereotypes fit into a broader picture of psychological processes 
among minority group members. 
Now that the relationship between outgroup stereotypes and participants’ well-being is 
established, future research should consider how outgroup stereotypes might relate to other 
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aspects of minority groups’ health.  If heterosexual stereotypes elicit well-being and happiness 
related to being LGBQ, and similar feelings of pride, belonging, and affirmation are well-
documented buffers to psychological stress (Fingerhut, Peplau, & Gable, 2010; Major & 
O'Brien, 2005; Meyer, 2003; C. T. Miller & Kaiser, 2001), then stereotypes about heterosexual 
people might attenuate stress and negative outcomes associated with stigma and prejudice (e.g., 
reduced self-esteem, increased internalized homophobia).  It is well documented that high levels 
of internalized homophobia and self-reported stress drastically contribute to minorities’ mental 
and physical health and are strongly related to increased suicide rates among LGBQ adults and 
youth (e.g., Duncan & Hatzenbuehler, 2014; Frost & Meyer, 2009; Hatzenbuehler, 2009; 
Hatzenbuehler, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Erickson, 2008; Huebner & Davis, 2007; Kaysen et al., 
2014; Meyer, 2003, 2013; Williamson, 2000).  Thus, understanding how outgroup stereotypes 
foster psychological well-being has more applied implications when considered in larger 
frameworks of stigma, stress, and health.  To summarize, outgroup stereotypes might reduce 
LGBQ people’s stress because outgroup stereotypes trigger the buffers to stress (e.g., well-being 
and happiness with LGBQ identities).  If this is the case, outgroup stereotypes may be useful for 
minorities when they are in stress-inducing contexts (e.g., faced with anti-gay prejudice).  That 
is, outgroup stereotypes might be one of many mechanisms that interrupt the relationship 
between stigma and stress.   
As I discussed in Study 2, stereotypes about dominant outgroups may serve a unique (if 
not an adaptive) purpose for minority groups.  Drawing on the results from Studies 2 and 3 and 
research on stress and coping, one purpose of these stereotypes might be that outgroup 
stereotypes enhance ingroup solidarity and psychological health even when ingroup membership 
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is devalued and stigmatized.  The results of Study 3 move us closer to understanding the role that 
outgroup stereotypes may play in a larger picture of minority groups’ psychological adjustment. 
Conclusion 
 In Studies 2 and 3, I tested how a minority group’s stereotypes about a dominant 
outgroup affect minority group members’ psychological well-being.  These data indicate that 
exposure to stereotypes about a dominant group benefits minority group members— LGBQ 
participants who viewed stereotypes about heterosexual people experienced greater 
psychological well-being and happiness with being a member of the LGBQ community than 
those who were not exposed to heterosexual stereotypes.  This finding contributes to a broader 
body of research related to the effects of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation.  In 
particular, these data suggest that outgroup stereotypes strengthen the ingroup through their well-
being vis-à-vis LGBQ identities.  In sum, this research signifies that some outgroup stereotypes 
might hold adaptive value for a minority ingroup. 
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The current package of studies prioritizes minority standpoint by treating LGBQ people 
as informative and active agents in intergroup relations.  Study 1 aimed to to empirically validate 
a measure of upward contempt as felt by members of minority groups (LGBQ people) toward 
dominant groups (heterosexual people).  Studies 2 and 3 examined the potential for stereotypes 
about a dominant outgroup to affect the psychological health and well-being of a minority 
ingroup.  Across all studies, the minority-focused approach to research fosters productive new 
research questions for understanding perceptions of heterosexual people.  Directions for future 
research were discussed within each study; here, I address whether minority groups’ 
psychological processes are unique from those of dominant groups, I identify individual and 
contextual considerations for future research, and I develop new research questions that allow for 
an intersectional analysis of intergroup perceptions.   
Different Social Status: Same Process? 
One question beyond the scope of the current research is whether all groups, regardless of 
status, similarly experience psychological processes related to contempt and outgroup 
stereotypes.  Put differently, it is unclear whether the findings from these studies elucidate 
nuances in intergroup behavior among minority group samples (i.e., LGBQ people) or merely 
strengthen extant knowledge in the field of intergroup relations about how all ingroups and 
outgroups behave.  Although there may be similarities between minority and dominant ingroups, 
I argue that there is uniqueness to the psychological experience of being a member of a low 
CHAPTER 5: General Discussion 
 		 63 
status group and perceiving an outgroup that is of higher social status.  In agreement with 
feminist methodologists and prejudice researchers who are pushing the boundaries of how we 
study intergroup relations, it is unwise to overlook the distinctive social locations and lived 
experiences of participants.  Being a member of a devalued group in real life, on a day-to-day 
basis, is not a situation that can be imitated by randomly assigning group membership in a 
laboratory experiment (as commonly performed in minimal group paradigms) or learned about 
by studying the psychological processes of dominant group members.  Minority groups deserve 
research about them not because they can replicate what we already know, but because we 
cannot know everything we can know about human psychology without their inclusion.  As 
further evidence, I discuss how minority groups and dominant groups may differ in lieu of the 
current results regarding upward contempt and stereotypes about outgroups. 
Upward contempt.  Across disciplinary lines, scholars believe contempt to be an 
interpersonal emotion that is about status, morality, and the disapproval of those who fail to 
fulfill their roles in society (see Izard, 1977; Solomon, 1993).  In contrast, more recent 
definitions of contempt in psychology that distinguish between morally-driven emotions (e.g., 
anger and disgust) suggest that contempt is directed toward groups who are perceived as 
incompetent and toward groups that suffer negative outcomes that are believed to be avoidable 
(Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).  For example, welfare recipients, people of lower income, drug 
addicts, obese individuals, and gay men with HIV are met with contempt (e.g., Cuddy et al., 
2008; Fiske et al., 2002; Osborne & Davies, 2012; Vartanian, Thomas, & Vanman, 2013)— 
these groups are perceived as incompetent and destructive to larger society and the common 
good.  When considering the “contempt” that low status groups may hold toward high status 
groups, the given definition of contempt is ill-fitting.  Thus, we are left with two options for 
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moving forward with studying “contempt” as a prejudicial emotion: (a) we must conclude that, 
based on the definition of contempt in psychology, it is unlikely that contempt can ever be held 
for high-ranking groups or (b) we must re-work the definition of contempt to allow for contempt 
to be held in an upward direction.  Given Miller’s writings on contempt and the results from 
Study 1, broadening our understanding of contempt and its directional limits is a promising 
course of action.  In doing so, we cannot merely apply the definition of downward contempt to 
describe the experience of upward contempt; instead, we should treat upward contempt as a new 
form of contempt that exists within minority groups. 
How does upward contempt differ from downward contempt?  Drawing on Miller’s work 
(who called upward contempt a form of rebellion), previous qualitative data (Matsick & Conley, 
2016a), and participants’ responses on the newly developed Upward Contempt Scale (Study 1), I 
suspect that upward contempt might include some degree of social and political resistance— a 
concept omitted from previous work on (downward) contempt in psychology.  Resistance, in this 
case, describes one’s desire to push back against those with power and to critique systems that 
maintain group inequality.  That is, upward contempt may be driven by people’s willingness to 
resist the given status and superiority of the dominant group; thus, resistance may be a key 
feature of upward contempt used to distinguish upward contempt from downward contempt.   
Future research should empirically tease apart downward contempt and upward contempt 
by identifying common and unique factors that motivate both forms of contempt.  Another way 
to differentiate downward and upward contempt is to consider how a minority group may hold 
downward contempt for a group below them and hold upward contempt for a group above them.  
In this scenario, it seems unlikely that identical contextual factors would elicit contempt to both 
the high and low status targets and that identical individual differences and psychological 
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mechanisms would explain both forms of contempt held to targets differing in status.  For 
example, downward contempt may serve to maintain the status quo whereas upward contempt 
may function to challenge the status quo.  Moreover, Miller (1997) suggests that downward 
contempt has a greater likelihood to occur with doubts about its legitimacy (e.g., feelings of 
guilt, shame, or concern for the target may accompany feelings of downward contempt) than 
upward contempt— a contempt that is presumably free of guilt, shame, or pity for the high status 
target.  In addition, future studies should confirm that upward contempt, as currently presented 
and defined, is not held by dominant groups toward minority groups in order to verify that 
upward contempt is truly an upward psychological response among people who are of lower 
status. 
I expect there are some points of commonality between upward and downward contempt.  
The desire to belong to the ingroup can foster feelings of contempt toward the outgroup as a way 
to enhance ingroup solidarity (Brewer, 1999).  Both upward and downward contempt may serve 
as mechanisms of reinforcing group differences and engaging in ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
derogation.  These basic social psychological processes should play similar roles in enhancing 
the ingroup and an ingroup’s psychological health regardless of the direction of contempt.  Thus, 
in the context of group relations, though the outcomes of upward and downward contempt may 
be the same, the contexts and predictors of both forms of contempt may differ. 
Outgroup stereotypes.  The results from Studies 2 and 3 indicate that exposure to 
stereotypes about an outgroup cause ingroup members to feel greater psychological well-being 
and greater happiness about their group membership.  Further, extant theories of intergroup 
biases and social identity would suggest that outgroup derogation (e.g., outgroup stereotypes) 
enhance psychological outcomes among the ingroup.  As a result, it may be tempting for 
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researchers to infer that the same intergroup processes are at play in intergroup dynamics 
regardless of the ingroup’s status (low or high).  However, there are fundamental differences 
between stereotypes about minority outgroups versus stereotypes about dominant outgroups.  
First and foremost, minority groups have limited social, political, and economic power; 
therefore, the stereotypes that they hold about dominant outgroups have relatively less impact on 
the lives of dominant outgroups than vice versa.  The stereotypes that minority group members 
hold about dominant outgroups cannot influence the social hierarchy and social values to the 
same extent as dominant groups’ stereotypes about a minority outgroup.  I would imagine that 
stereotypes about dominant outgroups serve a more meaningful psychological purpose for 
minority groups than they influence dominant groups who are the targets of these stereotypes.  
Although there are similarities regarding the basic aspects of stereotypes about any group (e.g., 
they are over-simplified, exaggerated, and used as cognitive shortcuts), I suggest our knowledge 
of stereotype functionality is limited if we only evaluate stereotypes that dominant groups hold 
about other outgroups (i.e., stereotypes that can influence and maintain status discrepancies).  
Outgroup stereotypes as held by minority groups are worth revisiting for both theoretical 
and applied purposes.  First, psychological theories created from the standpoint of dominant 
groups should be tested (and, if needed, reworked) with minority groups.  In order for theories to 
be generalizable, they should be tested in multiple contexts.  In particular, theories and 
frameworks related to stereotyping should be tested with flipped scripts: positioning minorities 
as perceivers and dominant groups as targets.  Knowledge that results from dominant groups’ 
perspectives may not accurately describe the perspectives of minority groups.  For example, we 
would likely discourage researchers from applying theories built exclusively on gay men’s 
perspectives to the lives of heterosexual people without carefully evaluating the costs of doing 
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so; the same restraint should be employed when applying frameworks developed from dominant 
groups’ perspectives to explain those of minority groups.  This double standard reflects 
heterosexist bias in research— researchers assume that research conducted with heterosexual 
participants is useful to everyone, whereas research with LGBQT participants is only relevant to 
other LGBQT people (McClelland & Dutcher, 2016).  Thus, by examining outgroup stereotypes 
from the minority perspective, we have the opportunity both to refine preexisting theories of 
stereotyping and to uncover new ones. 
In addition to the theoretical benefits of a minority-focused approach to research, the 
study of outgroup stereotypes among minority groups yields applied implications.  If outgroup 
stereotypes are part of a minority groups’ toolkit for dealing with inequality and managing a 
stigmatized identity, then we can start to bridge research on intergroup biases with that of social 
and minority stress.  As mentioned previously, minority groups’ perceptions of dominant groups 
are omitted from both bodies of work (i.e., intergroup behavior and social stress), yet the current 
research would suggest that there is a link between the two.  Perceptions of dominant groups 
should not only be of interest to intergroup relations researchers wanting to push theory forward; 
but also, perceptions of dominant groups may help to explain why some stigmatized group 
members have more positive or negative outcomes than others.  Perhaps, there are certain ways 
of perceiving the dominant outgroup that can disrupt the relationship between stigma and stress 
(e.g., psychological and physical health disparities).  If someone who is a target of stigma and 
prejudice holds certain outgroup stereotypes, do they feel better about their own group 
belonging?  By considering outgroup stereotypes as an adaptive strategy for coping with 
prejudice, we can extend our knowledge of mechanisms that buffer stress.  As stigma and 
prejudice researchers push for more interventional research, I note that the potential for 
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intervention with outgroup stereotyping is limited.  That is, it would be unethical to encourage 
outgroup stereotypes as a way for minority groups to enhance their ingroup; however, by 
understanding the role of intergroup perceptions in the context of minority stress, we may better 
identify the tools that members of minority groups have in their arsenal to overcome stigma and 
prejudice.  
Individual Differences in Intergroup Perceptions 
 Future research should examine individual differences among members of minority 
groups that are linked with their perceptions of dominant groups.  Here, I consider some factors 
that should theoretically predict LGBQ people’s perceptions of heterosexual people in terms of 
upward contempt and outgroup stereotypes. 
Previous experiences with anti-gay prejudice.  One individual difference variable that 
contributes to the psychological health of members of minority groups is their previous 
experience with outgroup members (e.g., being targets of prejudice and discrimination; Frost et 
al., 2015; Meyer, 2003, 2007).  Moreover, Johnson and Lecci (2003) found that experiences of 
previous discrimination— an irrelevant factor when examining dominant group members’ 
attitudes towards minority groups— predict Black people’s attitudes towards whites.  
Specifically, to the extent that one has experienced racial discrimination, s/he holds more 
negative attitudes toward white people.  Thus, not only do previous experiences with prejudice 
and discrimination vary from person to person, but these experiences are associated with their 
psychological health, physical health, and attitudes toward the dominant group.  Given the role 
of previous experiences with prejudice as an individual difference factor in minority stress 
research and intergroup attitudes research, I expect that LGBQ people who have experienced a 
greater extent of anti-gay prejudice would report more upward contempt than people who have 
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had less exposure to anti-gay prejudice.  Moreover, this factor may also moderate the 
relationship between outgroup stereotypes and psychological health, such that the effect is 
intensified among those who have had the most experience with anti-prejudice and 
discrimination. 
Internalized prejudice.  Another factor that should relate to minority group members’ 
perceptions of dominant groups is internalized prejudice (also known as internalized 
homophobia among LGBQ people or outgroup favoritism).  Internalized homophobia is the 
process in which sexual minorities internalize and hold negative societal attitudes directed 
toward their own group (see Meyer & Dean, 1998).  It is well documented that some minority 
group members, including LGBQ people, experience “self-hate” and even favor the outgroup 
and the systems that oppress them (e.g., Herek, Cogan, Gillis, & Glunt, 1997; Jost, Banaji, & 
Nosek, 2004; Ross & Rosser, 1996; Williamson, 2000).  Models of minority stress account for 
internalized homophobia; for example, those who score high on measures of internalized 
homophobia experience more negative psychological outcomes (e.g., stress and depression 
related to their identities; DiPlacido, 1988) and encounter greater relationship problems in their 
same-sex relationships (e.g., Frost & Meyer, 2009).  Clearly, internalized homophobia is an 
important component of LGBQ people’s psychological experiences and adjustment.  Future 
studies that use the Upward Contempt Scale could test if internalized homophobia is linked to 
LGBQ people’s perceptions of heterosexual people (e.g., those who internalize anti-gay 
prejudice may feel less upward contempt).  Moreover, research that examines the effect of 
outgroup stereotypes on psychological well-being should consider whether stereotypes about the 
dominant group alleviates feelings of internalized homophobia. 
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Critiques of social boundaries.  As I alluded to in my discussion of upward versus 
downward contempt, upward contempt might be one way for members of minority groups to 
express their critiques of social boundaries (e.g., symbolic lines that create and maintain 
institutional differences in social status; see Lamont & Molnár, 2002 for a review of the study of 
social boundaries in the social sciences).  Cultural sociologists suggest that symbolic boundaries 
explain group differentiation processes and self-categorization, such that people create 
conceptual distinctions between social categories while uniting with ingroup members based on 
similarities and distancing from outgroup members based on differences.  The current research 
has implications for understanding how LGBQ people think about social boundaries that 
cultivate and maintain sexual inequality.   
The Upward Contempt Scale is a test of people’s engagement with the broader social 
boundaries between LGBQ and heterosexual people.  In particular, I argue that feelings of 
upward contempt reframe symbolic boundaries from the minority standpoint.  That is, upward 
contempt does not deconstruct boundaries (e.g., by framing heterosexual people and LGBQ 
people as more similar than different); instead, upward contempt simultaneously reinforces 
boundaries while it contests the given construction of those boundaries.  For example, 
participants’ scores on the minorities’ superiority subscale assess participants’ reinforcement of 
differences; specifically, this subscale measures the extent to which LGBQ people perceive 
themselves as positively different from heterosexual people.  Scores on the unwarranted status 
subscale challenge the current structure of boundaries, such that LGBQ people perceive 
heterosexuals as underserving of their given status in the social hierarchy.  Put simply, we can 
think of one’s endorsement of minorities’ superiority as a demonstration of ingroup support and 
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one’s endorsement of heterosexual people’s unwarranted status as a critique of the current social 
structure. 
Similarly, social psychological theories can explain how people defend and promote the 
status quo created by symbolic boundaries.  For example, those who score high in social 
dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and political conservatism are more likely to 
favor their ingroup and justify a social hierarchy of groups (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).  However, it is unclear how sexual minorities would score 
on these measures (e.g., by scoring high on social dominance orientation, are LGBQ people 
endorsing their own oppression or agreeing with their superiority to groups of lower status?).  
For example, if white gay men completed a measure of social dominance orientation, it would be 
necessary to identify the aspects of social hierarchies that they endorse (e.g., racial hierarchies, 
gender hierarchies, or hierarchies based on sexual orientation).  As currently used in social 
psychology, these theories do not easily account for multiple group memberships; thus, 
understanding how these factors explain outgroup perceptions from the minority standpoint 
would be a challenge for feminist researchers concerned with people’s multiple group 
memberships.  Adapted measures to assess social dominance orientation from the minority group 
perspective would be a useful tool to investigate how personality traits that predict sociopolitical 
values might shape perceptions of dominant outgroups. 
In sum, by drawing on previous research, I predict that those who have little experience 
with anti-gay prejudice, experience high levels of internalized homophobia, and have little desire 
to critique social boundaries will hold less upward contempt toward heterosexual people.  All of 
these factors can help us to further understand upward contempt’s nomological network and to 
gain more insight into how minority group members psychologically benefit from exposure to 
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outgroup stereotypes.  
Intergroup Perceptions within Hostile Contexts 
 The purpose of the current research was to develop a measure of upward contempt and to 
test the relationship between outgroup stereotypes and ingroup well-being.  One subsequent step 
for both projects is to consider how social contexts influence feelings of upward contempt and 
outgroup stereotypes.  In fact, part of the scale development process is to examine how a newly 
developed scale functions in different contexts, under different experimental conditions, and 
across different time points.  Future research should consider how contextual factors, such as 
anti-gay prejudice compared to LGBQ-affirming context, might trigger LGBQ people’s feelings 
of upward contempt toward heterosexual people.  There is clear evidence to suggest that anti-gay 
contexts have dire effects on the lives of LGBQT people.  For example, Duncan and 
Hatzenbuehler (2014) evaluated the relationship between anti-gay hate crimes and the 
psychological health of people who identify as LGBT.  Duncan and Hatzenbuehler (2014) found 
that the prevalence of hate crimes in communities was associated with suicidal thoughts and 
attempts among LGBT-identified adolescents.  Thus, research that tests how upward contempt 
and outgroup stereotypes serve protective functions in these midst of anti-gay prejudice would be 
of particular relevance to members of stigmatized groups who are in less accepting and affirming 
communities. 
Intersectional Considerations 
Although this research applies a feminist and queer lens to social psychological theories 
of group processes, it is limited in its intersectional focus.  An intersectional perspective allows 
for a deeper analysis of individuals and their multiple group memberships and, more specifically, 
the ways in which multiple disadvantaged identities texturize an individual’s experience (see 
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Cole, 2009 for a discussion of intersectionality in psychology research).  Because the results of 
the current research are based on predominantly white LGBQ samples, it is unclear how 
perceptions of heterosexual groups may influence the psychological health of LGBQ people of 
color.  Moreover, it is unclear who is included in heterosexual target groups (e.g., white 
heterosexual people, heterosexual people of color).  Previous research on intergroup perceptions 
indicates that people tend to think of the most prototypical members of target groups when 
forming their impressions of a target (i.e., drawing on perceptions of male group members to 
form one's perceptions of the group at large;  Eagly & Kite, 1987; Matsick & Conley, 2016a); 
thus, I expect that participants’ feelings and attitudes captured in this current research are mostly 
directed toward white and male heterosexual people.   
Future studies should attend to the intersections of race, gender, and sexual orientation by 
accounting for the perceiver’s identities as well as the identities of the target.  For example, 
feelings of upward contempt toward heterosexual people may vary by the race of the target 
group.  On one hand, LGBQ people may feel more upward contempt to white heterosexual 
people (i.e., those with greater societal status) than heterosexual people of color.  In other words, 
to the extent that a group holds societal power, it will be a target of upward contempt.  However, 
LGBQ people may hold more negative attitudes to people of color.  First, white people’s 
stereotypes about Black people commonly include the idea that Black Americans are very 
religious and this stereotype might be perceived as at odds with the goals of LGBQ people (G. 
M. Gilbert, 1951; Madon et al., 2001).   Second, although research suggests that homophobia 
among Black men and women does not appear to be more prevalent than among their white 
counterparts, (Herek & Capitanio, 1995), conversations surrounding the passing of Proposition 8 
to ban same-sex marriage in California largely blamed Black American and Latino voters (see 
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Abrajano, 2010 for a discussion of political attitudes toward same-sex marriage in the midst of 
Proposition 8).   Future research on LGBQ people’s perceptions of heterosexuals should 
investigate the ways in which participant race and target race compound the dynamics between 
LGBQ and heterosexual people. 
Final Remarks 
As Shelton (2000) thoughtfully stated, the study of minority groups’ perspectives does 
not override the value of studying dominant groups’ perceptions of minority groups.  At the root 
of prejudice and social inequality is power; if the goal is to reduce prejudice, we must continue to 
study dominant groups’ perspectives and experiences.  Moreover, researchers that empower 
minority groups as active agents in intergroup dynamics should note that minority groups’ 
attitudes are not nearly as destructive or influential even if they hold negative biases toward other 
groups.  Those with relatively less societal power cannot use prejudice as a weapon of injustice 
to the same extent as groups with greater power.  In other words, it would be unrealistic to expect 
that minority groups’ negative attitudes toward or perceptions of other groups have the same 
consequences as when dominant groups hold negative attitudes toward other groups.  
Furthermore, despite political strides toward equality that are made within minority 
groups (i.e., LGBQT communities), status discrepancies between LGBQ and heterosexual people 
are far from being resolved and still play an influential role in the lives of LGBQ people (e.g., 
LGBQT people experience discrimination, health issues, stigma in receiving health care, suicide 
ideation, obstacles to having families, and microaggressions at greater rates than their 
heterosexual counterparts; Barbara, Quandt, & Anderson, 2001; Cochran, 2001; Duncan & 
Hatzenbuehler, 2014; Hatzenbuehler et al., 2008; Meyer, 2003, 2007).  Moreover, many of these 
issues are exacerbated for people of color (e.g., Balsam, Molina, Beadnell, Simoni, & Walters, 
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2011).  Thus, the need for research that examines relations between LGBQ people and 
heterosexual people is far from becoming obsolete.  Ultimately, prejudice is still a “wicked 
problem” in society— one with multiple causes and multiple consequences.  An issue as 
complex as this one requires that we cover it from every angle, including people’s views from 
the bottom.
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1. These data were collected prior to the June 26, 2015 ruling of Obergefell v Hodges in 
favor of same-sex marriage in the United States. 
 
2. It is reasonable to assume that most researchers who conduct multifaceted psychological 
studies prefer shorter scales with high internal consistency in order to simultaneously test 
multiple measures in one study.  Therefore, researchers should mind the length of newly 
developed scales.  When developing a new measure, if the alpha is at least .70 and there 
are plenty of retained items, one can choose to eliminate items that will not negatively 
influence the reliability of the scale (Hinkin, 1998).  It is common to retain approximately 
50% of the original items in the final scale (Cortina, 1993; Hinkin, 1998).  None of the 
included items in the new upward contempt measure drastically increase reliability if they 
are removed; however, if scale length is a concern, revisiting tests of internal consistency 
may be one approach to identifying additional items to remove. 
 
3. There was an administrative error made in the random assignment of the conditions in 
Study 3, such that Qualtrics Survey Software presented the conditions that included 
videos slightly more often than the condition that did not include a video (control).  This 
explains why there were fewer participants in the control group than the conditions that 
required participants to watch a video.  This error was rectified midway through data 
collection to ensure that Qualtrics evenly presented the conditions to participants.  
 
FOOTNOTES 
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Table 1.1 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Loading Matrix (three-factor solution; N = 371) 
  
 Factor Loading 
   1   2  3 
Factor 1: Minorities’ Superiority    
     LGBQ people have some better traits than heterosexual people do. .70 
.70 
.79 
.86 
.66 
.73 
.71 
.71 
.09 
.00 
-.02 
-.04 
-.04 
.00 
-.04 
.03 
-.01 
.01 
-.05 
-.06 
-.01 
.02 
.05 
.05 
     In some ways, LGBQ people are superior to heterosexuals. 
     LGBQ people have better attitudes than heterosexual people do. 
     LGBQ people have better personalities than heterosexuals do. 
     Heterosexuals are inferior to LGBQ people in some ways. 
     Heterosexuals’ lives are boring compared to LGBQ people’s lives. 
     LGBQ people have had greater life experiences than heterosexuals. 
     LGBQ people are more informed about the world than heterosexuals are. 
Factor 2: Unwarranted Status    
     Heterosexuals think they are better than they really are. .16 
.21 
-.13 
.01 
-.12 
.13 
.03 
-.18 
.60 
.64 
.74 
.71 
.62 
.72 
.77 
.76 
.06 
-.07 
.06 
.00 
.10 
-.03 
-.07 
.02 
     A lot of things heterosexuals get to enjoy in life are unearned. 
     It is unfair that heterosexuals get special treatment in society over other people. 
     The privileges that heterosexuals are given are unjustified. 
     Heterosexuals are wrong to think that their way of life is the best way of life. 
     Heterosexual people aren’t as great as they think they are. 
     The power that heterosexual people hold isn’t deserved. 
     Heterosexuals aren’t as superior to other people as they’d like to believe. 
Factor 3: Devaluing Attributes       
     Heterosexuals care about silly things. .30 
-.05 
-.13 
.20 
.06 
-.07 
.04 
.10 
.01 
-.03 
.54 
.74 
.63 
.46 
.68 
     Some of heterosexuals’ values are unimportant. 
     Some of heterosexuals’ moral values are ridiculous. 
     Heterosexuals’ vales are inessential.  
     Heterosexuals care too much about traditions that aren’t important in life. 
Items Dropped for Failing to Correlate with Any Other Items at r > |0.30|    
     Heterosexuals are better than LGBQ people in most ways. (rev)    
     Heterosexuals deserve to be a high status group in society. (rev)    
     Heterosexuals promote values that are necessary to live a fulfilling life. (rev)    
     Heterosexuals’ morals help to create a better society. (rev)    
     The traditions that heterosexuals care about are a meaningful part of life. (rev)    
     Some of heterosexuals’ religious values are senseless.    
Note.  Boldface indicates the factor onto which each of the strongest items loads.  Loadings are reported from the 
oblique rotation pattern matrix for the three-factor solution.  Participants indicated their agreement with each item 
on a seven point-scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). 
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Table 1.2 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Loading Matrix (two-factor solution; N = 371) 
 
 Factor Loading 
       1       2 
Factor 1: Minorities’ Superiority   
     LGBQ people have some better traits than heterosexual people do. .71 
.71 
.77 
.83 
.65 
.73 
.73 
.74 
.07 
.00 
-.04 
-.07 
-.04 
.01 
-.03 
.04 
     In some ways, LGBQ people are superior to heterosexuals. 
     LGBQ people have better attitudes than heterosexual people do. 
     LGBQ people have better personalities than heterosexuals do. 
     Heterosexuals are inferior to LGBQ people in some ways. 
     Heterosexuals’ lives are boring compared to LGBQ people’s lives. 
     LGBQ people have had greater life experiences than heterosexuals. 
     LGBQ people are more informed about the world than heterosexuals are. 
Factor 2: Unwarranted Status   
     Heterosexuals think they are better than they really are. .18 
.17 
-.11 
.00 
-.08 
.12 
-.01 
-.17 
.63 
.61 
.76 
.71 
.66 
.71 
.75 
.77 
     A lot of things heterosexuals get to enjoy in life are unearned. 
     It is unfair that heterosexuals get special treatment in society over other people. 
     The privileges that heterosexuals are given are unjustified. 
     Heterosexuals are wrong to think that their way of life is the best way of life. 
     Heterosexual people aren’t as great as they think they are. 
     The power that heterosexual people hold isn’t deserved. 
     Heterosexuals aren’t as superior to other people as they’d like to believe. 
Note.  Boldface indicates the factor onto which each of the strongest items loads.  Loadings are reported from the 
oblique rotation pattern matrix for the two-factor solution.  Participants indicated their agreement with each item 
on a seven point-scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). 
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Table 1.3 
 
Intercorrelations Among Upward Contempt and Validity Measures (N = 371)  
 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. UC: Minorities’ Superiority 3.69 1.24 (.90)       
2. UC: Unwarranted Status 4.95 1.19 .35** (.89)      
3. Upward Contempt (full scale) 4.32 1.00 .89** .81** (.89)     
4. Acknowledge Status Discrep. 5.25 1.09 .15* .50** .39** (.74)    
5. Positive Emotion  4.22 1.28 -.13* -.30** -.26** -.27** (.86)   
6. Negative Emotion 3.28 1.24 .34** .34** .42** .23** -.18** (.95)  
7. Social Desirability  5.58 2.89 .07 -.16* -.05 -.13* .15* -.14* (.71) 
Note. UC = upward contempt; M = mean; SD = standard deviation; Coefficient αs are reported in parentheses along the diagonal of the correlation matrix; *p ≤ 
.01 and **p < .001. 
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Table 2.1 
 
Means (Standard Deviations) by Video Condition (N = 146) 
    
 Video Condition 
Outcome Heterosexual Stereotypes LGBQT Stereotypes 
Psychological Well-Being 4.41 (0.96)a 3.93 (0.96)b 
Happiness with Being LQBQT 9.08 (1.23)a 8.26 (1.85)b 
Collective Self-Esteem 4.44 (0.72) 4.35 (0.81) 
Note. N = 146 (n = 72 in heterosexual stereotypes condition and n = 74 in LGBQT stereotypes condition).  
Subscripts indicate instances in which a differs from b at p < .01. 
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Table 3.1 
 
Means (Standard Deviations) by Video Condition (N = 221)   
 
 Video Condition 
Outcome Heterosexual 
Stereotypes 
LGBQT 
Stereotypes Control 
Psychological Well-Being 4.67 (0.81)a 4.29 (1.15)b 4.18 (1.00)b 
Happiness with Being LQBQT 8.49 (1.94)a 7.62 (2.54)b 7.48 (2.58)b 
Upward Contempt 4.19 (0.91) 4.37 (0.91) 4.44 (0.82) 
Minorities’ Superiority (subscale) 3.67 (1.04) 3.82 (1.13) 3.69 (1.17) 
Unwarranted Status (subscale) 4.71 (1.24)a 4.92 (1.13) 5.19 (0.99)b 
Note. N = 221 (n = 91 in heterosexual stereotypes condition, n = 76 in LGBQT stereotypes condition, and n = 54 
in control condition).  Subscripts indicate instances in which a differs from b at p < .05. 
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Table 3.2 
 
Correlations Among Upward Contempt and Primary Variables 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. UC: Minorities’ Superiority         − .23** .80*** .09 -.12 .24** -.05 .10 
2. UC: Unwarranted Status .26*         − .77*** .56*** -.25** .40*** -.20* .03 
3. Upward Contempt .75*** .83***         − .40*** -.23** .41*** -.13 .08 
4. Acknowledge Status Discrep. .18 .62*** .53***        − -.26** .39*** -.27** -.19* 
5. Positive Emotion -.10 -.33** -.28** -.34***       − -.43*** .48*** .35*** 
6. Negative Emotion .17 .26** .27** .32** -.36***       − -.45*** -.23** 
7. Psychological Well-Being .04 -.20* -.11 -.31** .39*** -.44***         − .50*** 
8. Happiness with Being LGBQ .29** -.04 .13 -.03 .12 -.34*** .38***         − 
Note.  Correlations below the diagonal represent relationships between variables in the control condition (n = 130) and correlations above the diagonal 
represent relationships between variables in the heterosexual stereotypes condition (n = 91).  Participants provided their responses on measures 1-6 on seven-
point scales (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree), psychological well-being (six-point scale; greater numbers indicate greater well-being), and 
happiness with being LGBQ (1 = Not at All, 10 = Extremely); *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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APPENDIX A: Study 1 Measures 
 
Upward Contempt (original set of items; 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
 
1. Heterosexuals think they are better than they really are.  
2. A lot of things heterosexuals get to enjoy in life are unearned.  
3. It is unfair that heterosexuals get special treatment in society over other people.  
4. The privileges that heterosexuals are given are unjustified. 
5. Heterosexuals are wrong to think that their way of life is the best way of life.  
6. Heterosexuals deserve to be a high status group in society. (Rev)  
7. Heterosexual people aren’t as great as they think they are.  
8. The power that heterosexual people hold isn’t deserved.  
9. Heterosexuals aren’t as superior to other people as they’d like to believe.  
10. Heterosexuals are better than LGBQ people in most ways. (Rev)  
11. LGBQ people have some better traits than heterosexual people do.  
12. In some ways, LGBQ people are superior to heterosexuals.  
13. LGBQ people have better mentalities than heterosexuals.  
14. LGBQ people have better attitudes than heterosexual people do.  
15. LGBQ people have better personalities than heterosexuals do.  
16. Heterosexuals are inferior to LGBQ people in some ways.  
17. Heterosexuals’ lives are boring compared to LGBQ people’s lives.  
18. LGBQ people have had greater life experiences than heterosexuals.  
19. LGBQ people are more informed about the world than heterosexuals are.  
20. Heterosexuals care about silly things.  
21. Some of heterosexuals’ values are unimportant.  
22. Some of heterosexuals' moral values are ridiculous.  
23. Heterosexuals' values are inessential.  
24. Heterosexuals promote values that are necessary to live a fulfilling life. (Rev)  
25. Some of heterosexuals’ religious values are senseless.  
26. Heterosexuals’ morals help to create a better society. (Rev)  
27. Heterosexuals care too much about traditions that aren’t important in life.  
28. The traditions that heterosexuals care about are a meaningful part of life. (Rev) 
 
Acknowledgement of Status Discrepancies (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
 
1. Heterosexuals are more often in positions of power in society than LGBQ people. 
2. It is generally believed that LGBQ people are inferior to heterosexuals. 
3. Heterosexuals have greater societal status than LGBQ people. 
4. LGBQ people are treated like second-class citizens in society compared to heterosexuals. 
APPENDICIES 
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5. LGBQ and heterosexual people hold equal social status. (Rev) 
 
Measures of Affect (1 = Definitely Not, 7 = Definitely) 
 
1. Jealous 
2. Envious 
3. Suspicious 
4. Afraid 
5. Upset 
6. Nervous 
7. Hurt 
8. Judged 
9. Distressed 
10. Frustrated 
11. Inspired 
12. Enthusiastic 
13. Angry 
14. Resentful 
15. Happy 
16. Comfortable 
17. Pity 
18. Fear 
19. Hatred 
20. Disdain 
21. Love 
22. Positive 
23. Negative 
24. Disgust 
 
Social Desirability Scale (1 = True, 0 = False) 
 
1. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way.  
2. On a few occasions, I have given up something because I thought too little of my ability.  
3. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I 
knew they were right.  
4. No matter who is talking, I’m always a good listener. (Rev)  
5. I can remember “playing sick” to get out of something.  
6. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.  
7. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. (Rev)  
8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.  
9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. (Rev)  
10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. (Rev)  
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.  
12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.  
13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. (Rev) 	
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APPENDIX B: Study 2 and 3 Video Materials 
 
Figure B.1 
 
Images from Video Materials 
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Table B.1 
 
Stereotype Content: Heterosexual Video Condition 
 
“Stuff that Straight People Say… (Re-enacted by members of the gay community)” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8aOIRHtM70 
Video length: 1:40 minutes; 12 heterosexual woman comments, 12 heterosexual man comments 
 
    Role Heterosexual Stereotype Statement 
Actress 1 Unintelligent/Ditzy “No, I don’t follow the news. What am I? Like 60?” 
Actor 1 Unemotional “My dad says real men don’t cry, so I don’t.” 
Actress 2  “Fag Hag” “I don’t understand, like, why are all of the good guys gay?” 
Actor 2 Arrogant “I outdrank all my bros last night…I’m always the last one standing.” 
Actress 3 Judgmental “We’re not living together until we’re married. That’s what God wants us to do.” 
Actress 1 Dependent on Men “I don’t know how to pay this bill! My husband always does it for me.” 
Actor 1 Sexist “A woman’s place is in the kitchen and in my bedroom.” 
Actress 2 Latent Homosexuality “I mean, yeah I’ve been attracted to women before, but my parents would freak out!”  
Actor 2 Unattractive “How am I supposed to know what boot cut jeans are? Jeans are jeans.” 
Actress 3 Submissive to Men “The hubby is hungry, so I need to make him a sandwich.” 
Actor 2 Closed-minded “I meant gay like stupid, not gay like gay!” 
Actor 1 Latent Homosexuality “I swear I’m not really gay, just please don’t tell my girlfriend about this!” 
Actress 1 Breeder “Gotta get married soon – mom wants grandkids!” 
Actor 1 Intolerant “I’m cool with gay guys…I just don’t want them looking at me.” 
Actress 2 Tease “Well, I mean, my boyfriend does think it’d be hot if we kissed.” 
Actor 2 Sexualizes Lesbians “You’re a lesbian? Can I watch?” 
Actress 3 Has Bad Sex “Well I never expect to orgasm but it’s still fun I guess.” 
Actress 1 Hyper-Femininity  “I’m on my 10th store and I still haven’t found the perfect formal dress for tonight!” 
Actor 1 Macho “Baseball, sex, and women are my only interests.” 
Actress 2 Emotional “Well you know me, I just always cry at weddings!” 
Actor 2 Aggressive “I got kicked out of the bar for fighting those punks.” 
Actress 3 Vain “Uhhh…does this make me look fat?” 
Actor 2 Homophobic “No homo! Real dudes don’t sleep with dudes.” 
Actor 1 Member of Fraternity “Being hazed on my high school team was nothing like being hazed at my fraternity.” 
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Table B.2 
 
Stereotype Content: LGBQ Video Condition 
 
“Stuff that Gay People Say… (Re-enacted by members of the gay community)” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aAE9uEi2yJc 
Video length: 1:34 minutes; 12 lesbian comments, 12 gay comments 
Role Gay/Lesbian Stereotype Statement 
Actress 1 Can Fix Things “I’ll bring a six pack and a tool kit…best weekend ever! 
Actor 1 Devoted Gay Fan “Shut up! Lady Gaga is totally better than Katy Perry.” 
Actress 2 Lipstick Lesbian “All right, yeah, I get it, I don’t look like a lesbian!” 
Actor 2 Sensitive “If that jerk breaks up with you, come on over. We’ll watch a marathon of Girls, and there’s an entire pint of ice cream with your name on it!” 
Actress 3 Hypersexual “She’s only straight…until she’s not.” 
Actress 1 Soft Butch “Which flannel looks better on me?” 
Actor 1 Thin “Beer? Gross!” 
Actress 2 Athletic “Guys, I can’t Softball is on Saturday.”  
Actor 2 Top/Bottom Dynamics “Oh my god, he is such a bottom!” 
Actress 3 U-Haul/Fast Relationships “We’re moving in together.  Pack up the U-Haul!” 
Actor 2 Afraid of Vaginas “Can you not say ‘vagina’ around me please?” 
Actor 1 Not Athletic “Is football the one with the innings?” 
Actress 1 Devoted Lesbian Fan “I’ve seen Tegan and Sara in concert like, six times.” 
Actor 1 Feminine “Girrrrl, you look fierce!” 
Actress 2 Free Spirit “Wait, what do you mean you’re not vegan anymore?” 
Actor 2 Great Dancers “Why do people even go to bars if they’re not going to dance?” 
Actress 3 Ex-Drama “My ex and her girlfriend will meet us for dinner at seven.” 
Actress 1 Anti-Men  “Have I slept with men? No! I’m a gold star.” 
Actor 1 Great Dressers “He’s just jealous I have better hair, clothes, and shoes.” 
Actress 2 Relationship-Oriented “She’s like the Portia to my Ellen DeGeneres.” 
Actor 2 Promiscuous “There are not enough new men in town for me to sleep with.” 
Actress 3 Independent “What do you mean you don’t know how to change a tire?” 
Actor 2 Dramatic “Oh my god! That boy is such a diva! I can’t. I can’t even.” 
Actor 1 Vain “No, I’m not wearing makeup…I’m naturally flawless.” 
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APPENDIX C: Study 2 Measures 
 
Pre-testing Video Items (Scale of 1 to 5) 
 
1. Not at all Entertaining to Very Entertaining 
2. Not at all Funny to Very Funny 
3. Very Uninteresting to Very Interesting 
4. Not at all Accurate to Very Accurate 
5. Not at all Offensive to the LGBTQ Community to Very Offensive to the LGBQ Community 
6. Not at all Attractive to Very Attractive 
7. Not at all Likeable to Very Likeable 
8. Not at all Amusing to Very Amusing 
9. Very Unappealing to Very Appealing 
10. Not at all Artistic to Very Artistic 
11. How do LGBQ people look for making this video? (1 = Not Very Good, 5 = Very Good) 
 
Psychological Well-Being (Scale 1-6, greater numbers indicate more positive outcomes)  
 
1. Ashamed to Proud 
2. Inferior to Equal 
3. Discouraged to Encouraged 
4. Disrespected to Respected 
5. Afraid to Unafraid 
6. Unsafe to Safe 
7. Rejected to Accepted 
8. Threatened to Affirmed 
9. Stigmatized to Supported 
10. Alone to Close to Others 
11. Strong to Vulnerable (Rev) 
 
Collective Self Esteem Scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 6 = Strongly Agree) 
 
1. I feel that belonging to the LGBQ community is not a good thing for me. (Rev) 
2. My membership in the LGBQ community is an important reflection of who I am. 
3. My membership in the LGBQ community has little to do with how I feel about myself. (Rev) 
4. Belonging to the LGBQ community is an important part of my self-image. 
5. I feel good about belonging to the LGBQ community. 
6. I make a positive contribution to the LGBQ community. 
7. I regret belonging to the LGBQ community.  (Rev) 
8. I feel I don’t have much to offer the LGBQ community. (Rev) 
9. I’m glad I belong to the LGBQ community. 
 
General Happiness Item (1 = Not at All; 10 = Extremely) 
 
1. I feel happy to be LGBQ. 
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APPENDIX D: Study 3 Measures 
 
Pre-testing Video Items (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree) 
 
1. The video was funny. 
2. The video was entertaining. 
3. I was offended by the video. 
4. Other LGBQ people would enjoy watching the video. 
5. I did not like the video. 
6. I would share this video with my friends who identify as LGBQ. 	
Psychological Well-Being (Scale 1-6, greater numbers indicate more positive outcomes)  
 
1. Ashamed to Proud 
2. Inferior to Equal 
3. Discouraged to Encouraged 
4. Disrespected to Respected 
5. Afraid to Unafraid 
6. Unsafe to Safe 
7. Rejected to Accepted 
8. Threatened to Affirmed 
9. Stigmatized to Supported 
10. Alone to Close to Others 
11. Strong to Vulnerable (Rev) 	
General Happiness Item (1 = Not at All, 10= Extremely) 
 
1. I feel happy to be LGBQ.  
 
Upward Contempt (original set of items; 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
 
1. Heterosexuals think they are better than they really are.  
2. A lot of things heterosexuals get to enjoy in life are unearned.  
3. It is unfair that heterosexuals get special treatment in society over other people.  
4. The privileges that heterosexuals are given are unjustified. 
5. Heterosexuals are wrong to think that their way of life is the best way of life.  
6. Heterosexuals deserve to be a high status group in society. (Rev)  
7. Heterosexual people aren’t as great as they think they are.  
8. The power that heterosexual people hold isn’t deserved.  
9. Heterosexuals aren’t as superior to other people as they’d like to believe.  
10. Heterosexuals are better than LGBQ people in most ways. (Rev)  
11. LGBQ people have some better traits than heterosexual people do.  
12. In some ways, LGBQ people are superior to heterosexuals.  
13. LGBQ people have better mentalities than heterosexuals.  
14. LGBQ people have better attitudes than heterosexual people do.  
15. LGBQ people have better personalities than heterosexuals do.  
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16. Heterosexuals are inferior to LGBQ people in some ways.  
17. Heterosexuals’ lives are boring compared to LGBQ people’s lives.  
18. LGBQ people have had greater life experiences than heterosexuals.  
19. LGBQ people are more informed about the world than heterosexuals are.  
20. Heterosexuals care about silly things.  
21. Some of heterosexuals’ values are unimportant.  
22. Some of heterosexuals' moral values are ridiculous.  
23. Heterosexuals' values are inessential.  
24. Heterosexuals promote values that are necessary to live a fulfilling life. (Rev)  
25. Some of heterosexuals’ religious values are senseless.  
26. Heterosexuals’ morals help to create a better society. (Rev)  
27. Heterosexuals care too much about traditions that aren’t important in life.  
28. The traditions that heterosexuals care about are a meaningful part of life. (Rev) 
 
Acknowledgement of Status Discrepancies (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
 
1. Heterosexuals are more often in positions of power in society than LGBQ people. 
2. It is generally believed that LGBQ people are inferior to heterosexuals. 
3. Heterosexuals have greater societal status than LGBQ people. 
4. LGBQ people are treated like second-class citizens in society compared to heterosexuals. 
5. LGBQ and heterosexual people hold equal social status. (Rev) 
 
Measures of Affect (1 = Definitely Not, 7 = Definitely) 
 
1. Jealous 
2. Envious 
3. Suspicious 
4. Afraid 
5. Upset 
6. Nervous 
7. Hurt 
8. Judged 
9. Distressed 
10. Frustrated 
11. Inspired 
12. Enthusiastic 
13. Angry 
14. Resentful 
15. Happy 
16. Comfortable 
17. Pity 
18. Fear 
19. Hatred 
20. Disdain 
21. Love 
22. Positive 
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23. Negative 
24. Disgust
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